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THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM: LAW, NORMS,
AND TECHNOLOGY
CHRISTOPHER G. BRADLEY†
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the tools consumers use to buy and borrow have
changed radically. New technologies for advertising, contracting, and
transacting have proliferated, and so have fierce policy debates on issues
such as identity theft and online privacy; arbitration clauses and class action lawsuits; and Americans’ accumulation of debt and the unsavory practices sometimes used by collectors of it. Facing these realities, scholars,
policymakers, and advocates have devoted increasing energy to this area
of law. Despite its prominence, confusion persists regarding what consumer protection really is or does. Though much discussed, it remains undertheorized. In particular, analysis of consumer law and policy has not
sufficiently taken account of the implications of social and technological
change.
This Article constructs a new model of the consumer protection ecosystem by contextualizing purely legal constraints amid the other realities
of commercial relationships. Drawing on scholarship in the areas of technology, social change, and law, the model lays out three basic types of
constraints on the activities of participants in consumer commercial transactions: legal, technical, and social. This model provides a basis for exploring how those constraints interact and shape behavior.
The model has significant ramifications for scholars, policymakers,
and advocates. It underscores why the area of consumer commerce defies
one-size-fits-all solutions: good policies require not only consideration of
consumers, merchants, and the commercial relationships they pursue, but
of the dynamic social and technological contexts of those relationships.
For instance, when technology opens unexpected new areas of feasible
conduct, both law and social norms may lag behind in their ability to constrain its socially undesirable aspects. Focused, public deliberation and increased regulatory attention may be merited at least until social norms
have developed to define the acceptable contours of such conduct. This
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Article provides a more refined and inclusive framework for future research and debate.
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INTRODUCTION
As consumers, we all buy and borrow. For example, we buy everyday
goods and services from some merchants. And, we borrow money for
long-term investment, short-term liquidity, or simple convenience from
others. Due primarily to technological change, the tools with which we
buy have changed substantially in the past decade—and certainly in the
half-century or more since most laws regulating consumer transactions
came into force.
Few areas of public policy have drawn fiercer debate in recent years
than consumer protection. In part, these debates reflect the fact that we are
all consumers, affected by this area of policy every day of our lives. In
addition, vast sums of money are at stake. Many of the largest companies
in the world appear on the other side of consumer transactions, selling us
products, lending us money, or collecting our increasingly valuable personal data in exchange for online services.1 Most of all, technological de-

1. See, e.g., Nancy Moran, Apple Falls to Fourth-Biggest U.S. Company by Market Value,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-03/apple-
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velopments have provoked upheaval in this area; the pervasiveness of mobile technology and online commerce has unsettled social norms and rendered regulatory regimes obsolete.2 Consumers may feel empowered and
relieved at easier transacting3—but at the same time feel troubled and victimized by the complex, take-them-or-leave-them terms imposed by
online intermediaries that have so quickly become ubiquitous and inescapable.4
No wonder, then, that consumer protection has provoked fierce policy debate on issues such as identity theft,5 online privacy,6 arbitration
clauses,7 Americans’ accumulation of debt, and the unsavory practices
sometimes used by would-be collectors of that debt.8 In response to these
debates and developments, scholars, policymakers, and advocates devote
increasing energy to this area of law.
Despite this attention, confusion persists regarding what consumer
protection really is or does. The realities of social norms and technological
change have not been fully integrated into legal analyses of consumer
transactions. Drawing on scholarship in the areas of technology, social
norms, and law, this Article constructs a new model of the consumer protection ecosystem9 by contextualizing legal constraints within the lived
realities of commercial relationships. This realist-inflected model situates
is-now-fourth-biggest-u-s-company-by-market-value-chart (noting that Alphabet, Google’s parent
company, Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon were the top four most valuable U.S. companies by market
capitalization).
2. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, How Consumers Can Resist Companies’ Market Power, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/how-consumers-can-resist-companies-market-power.html.
3. See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, FinTech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63–
80 (2018) (describing financial technologies that have lowered transaction costs, while potentially
imposing some new costs).
4. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/techs-frightful-five-theyve-got-us.html.
5. See, e.g., Adam Janofsky, One Year After Equifax Breach: Criminal Charges, New State
Laws and Lost Chances, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/oneyear-after-equifax-breach-criminal-charges-new-state-laws-and-lost-chances-1536334479 (describing regulatory efforts in the aftermath of theft of almost 148 million individuals’ personal information
by major credit rating agency).
6. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html.
7. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465–66 (2015) (upholding class action waiver in arbitration agreement).
8. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Who Snatched My Car? Wells Fargo Did, NPR (Aug. 2, 2017, 5:47
PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/08/02/541182948/who-snatched-my-car-wells-fargo-did (noting that
Wells Fargo enrolled approximately 490,000 auto loan customers for unneeded and duplicative auto
insurance, leading to many defaults and repossessions of cars); Stacy Cowley, Debt Collectors’ Abuses
Prompt Consumer Agency to Propose New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/business/dealbook/debt-collectors-abuses-prompt-consumer-agency-to-propose-new-rules.html.
9. Ecosystem can be defined as “the complex of a community of organisms and its environment functioning as an ecological unit.” Ecosystem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ecosystem (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). In this context, as the model shows, it includes the constraints operating on both merchants and consumers who might wish to engage in a
particular action or behavior. See also infra Part II.C (discussing rationale for the model).

38

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1

consumer law amid other factors affecting those engaging in commerce.
The model serves as a theoretical basis for an integrated and nuanced consideration of the different parts of what has been known as “consumer protection” (itself a problematic term10). The model builds on the realist intuitions that motivate much advocacy work both for and against current laws
and policies, and considers the distinct types of constraints relevant to the
regulation of consumer commercial relationships.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the premises of the
model and lays out its basic features. This model relies on three different
types of constraints on consumer commercial transactions: legal, technical, and social. “Legal constraints” are produced by laws, the remedies
available for their breach, and the capacity of the institutions charged with
enforcing them.11 Actions not deterred by adequate legal constraints are
“legally feasible” actions. “Technical constraints” are those that are impossible due to the current state of technology, or possible but too expensive to be feasibly implemented.12 Actions not subject to such constraints
are “technically feasible.” “Social constraints” depend on social attitudes;
they prohibit actions that cannot be successfully hidden and that, when
publicly known, will draw condemnation and have high reputational consequences.13 Actions that can either be hidden or would not bring social
opprobrium if discovered are “socially feasible.”
Under this model, the set of “permitted actions” in consumer commercial relationships consists of everything not effectively barred by legal,
technical, or social constraints. It is from this set of permitted actions that
consumers and merchants choose when they engage in commerce.14 Actions outside the set of permitted actions are, in effect, not possible; consumers are “protected” from such actions, even if they would otherwise
prefer them.
The model examines the exogenous factors that constrain parties
from engaging in behavior they would otherwise prefer to take. The
model’s analytical framework looks to the experienced constraints on the
participants in relationships rather than merely legal constraints. In the
same way social scientists have demonstrated that “order without law” can
arise by virtue of complex social forces and technologists have argued that
“code is law” because software code regulates software users’ conduct,

10.
11.

See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.1. For a high-level summary of the consumer law regime, see JOHN A.
SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–8 (4th ed. 2013).
12. See infra Part II.A.3.
13. See infra Part II.A.2.
14. The model adopts the realist, “law-in-action,” orientation of scholars such as Stuart Macauley. See generally Stewart Macaulay & Elizabeth Mertz, New Legal Realism and the Empirical
Turn in Law, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL
PRACTICE (Elizabeth Mertz et al. eds., 2016). The core commitment of such an approach is to develop
policy based on an empirical, social science-influenced, practical consideration of the nature and effect
of legal tools such as contracts.
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this Article identifies nonlegal constraints that “regulate” the conduct of
those engaged in consumer transactions.15
The analogy of legal constraints to social constraints, or to code and
other technologically based constraints, is not perfect. Actors may feel and
behave differently in the face of social versus legal constraints—some will
be more constrained by one than the other.16 Still, each type of constraint
can effectively deter an action, any time, for any actor. For the purposes
of policy analysis, that deterrence is important regardless of how it is obtained.
This model does not rely on any particular views on, or justifications
for, the regulation of consumer commercial relationships. Indeed, the
model could be used to argue that nonlegal tools provide sufficient constraints, and market actors should be uninhibited by law. Alternatively, the
model could serve as the basis for an argument that more radical legal intervention is required—particularly in times of disruptive technological
advances that render existing regulatory regimes outdated. Either way, this
model provides a better tool for developing tailored policy approaches and
for considering the type and intensity of constraint most appropriate under
given circumstances.17 Thus, while the model itself is descriptive, it has
normative implications for policy in the realm of consumer commercial
relationships.
Debates about consumer law and policy tend to turn on whether, with
respect to a particular form of behavior, “the market” is working or will
work properly. If not, then legal intervention is thought to be necessary; if
15. My model is deeply influenced by many of the influential observations made by Lawrence
Lessig, both in his essay The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUDS. 661, 661–63 (1998), and in his
seminal work CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Even more directly, I have drawn
from the excellent reworking of these ideas in the intellectual property arena by Harry Surden. See
Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 135, 136–
43 (2013). The work of Robert Ellickson is of course fundamental as well to any work on law and
social norms and has influenced this work deeply. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 126, 127 (1994).
16. It is widely recognized that there are salient differences in the way law functions as opposed
to other forms of limitation, different forms of responses to legal constraints as opposed to other forms
of constraint (including code, technological cost, reputational sanction, etc.). James Grimmelman,
Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721–24 (2005) (outlining different “modalities”
of regulation, including law, code, architecture, etc.). “Legal consciousness” and “legal culture” are
two ways that “law and society” scholars have thought about the distinctiveness of law and legal force
as opposed to other forms of power and control, both from the perspective of the regulator and the
regulated. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 884, 888 (1988)
(discussing analogies and distinctions between law and other forms of social “discipline”); Laura Beth
Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About Law
and Street Harassment, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1055–56 (2008) (discussing how certain groups
perceive the role of law in their affairs); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663, 1663–64 (1989) (providing seminal discussion of literature on “legal consciousness”).
17. Thus, as discussed further below, see infra note 93 and accompanying text, the model itself
should not be read as an endorsement of the rather loaded, traditional concept of “consumer protection,” which implicitly and narrowly conceives of the policy goal as “protecting” consumers from
merchants. The term consumer protection is preserved only because “consumer law” is too narrow, as
it focuses solely on legal constraints; the more accurate and neutral “policies affecting consumer commercial relationships” is too cumbersome.
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so, then the market should be trusted and left alone. Advocates for regulation focus on particular, perceived market failures and call for intrusive
legal solutions. Opponents of regulation stress the general reliability of the
market’s resource allocations as well as the expenses of regulation.18 Debates between these competing normative perspectives are important, but
all of these debates rely on underlying theories of consumer and merchant
behavior that need more examination. This Article implicitly urges that the
dichotomy of “law versus markets” is unsatisfactory. The scholarship on
consumer law and commerce lacks a general framework for conceiving
how laws and markets alike interact with other factors that influence the
consumer commerce ecosystem over time—in particular, social and technical factors. This Article begins to fill the gaps in the existing literature
by proposing that we include a pragmatically driven emphasis on the functional constraints on merchants and consumers in their commercial ecosystem. The model at the heart of this Article considers the constraints—
social, technical, and legal—that override what would otherwise be the
market preferences of the consumer and merchant engaging in a consumer
transaction. This perspective is novel and important. It may be implicit in
some existing accounts, but a goal of this Article is to make explicit what
has been implicit. The theoretical foundation of consumer protection affects policy making, and only when laid out explicitly in detail can the
foundation be critiqued and refined.
Social and technical factors are not entirely separate from either law
or markets (nor are law and markets analytically distinct phenomena). Rather, these factors are influenced by one another. It is true that social and
technological factors can be, and are, considered “costs” to participants in
transactions and analyzed as part of the market. So can the costs imposed
by laws. Many valuable scholarly works implicitly take that approach.19
But that broad conception of “market” can be both underinclusive and
overinclusive. It is overinclusive because it lumps together so many different types of costs, short-term and long-term, reputational and monetary;
it is underinclusive because it fails to give particularized attention to the
innovations and the social changes that actually determine social and technological costs. Under existing legal as well as economic analyses, social

18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE
HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 43–44 (2004) (summarizing arguments of opponents of aggressive consumer protection laws). In addition to policy arguments, of course both sides rely on the forms of raw
power available to them: largely behind-the-scenes lobbying and political influence on the part of the
opponents of regulation, and largely social organizing and the publicizing of particular stories of abuse
on the part of consumer advocates. These political strategies are beyond the scope of this model, although they are relevant aspects of how both legality and social acceptability is determined for particular practices.
19. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 26, 101, 191, 233, 237 (2012) (including a section on “market
solutions” within each chapter); Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in Consumer Markets, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239995) (providing a useful survey and analysis of literature on “market failures” focused on reputation).
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and technological factors remain underappreciated aspects of the consumer protection ecosystem. There is a value in considering these factors
distinctly, rather than merely as lumped into an oversized and imprecise
category of “market dynamics,” even if these factors are eventually reincorporated into an analysis that relies on economic methodologies (as most
policy analyses ultimately do).
Part III discusses some ramifications of the consumer protection
model constructed in this Article. This model provides the basis for an
argument that more attention should be paid to (a) the interdependence of
legal and other forms of constraints on consumer commercial interactions,
and (b) the assessment of changes over time. These two aspects are linked.
Changes in one type of constraint—for instance, the development of a new
area of technology, or a change in legal regime—will affect the others.
Changes in technology may affect the social acceptability of an activity,20
or the social acceptability of conduct may affect its legal permissibility.
Or, less directly, changes in one type of constraint may expand or contract
the set of permitted actions, which over time may add pressure to ease, or
to tighten, other types of constraints. Policymakers should be aware of this
interdependence as they consider regulatory strategies.21 In addition, the
propensity for the balance of different constraints to change over time
should be considered more consistently and systematically. Perhaps most
importantly, when technology opens unexpected new areas of feasible
conduct, both law and social norms may lag behind in their ability to constrain its socially undesirable aspects. Focused, public deliberation and increased regulatory attention may be merited—at least until social norms
have developed to define the acceptable contours of such conduct.

20. For example, technology seems to have shaped expectations of privacy, expectations concerning the degree of formality required to complete a commercial transaction, and expectations concerning dispute resolution. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 248 (2016) (“PayPal's and eBay’s [Online Dispute Resolution] programs have garnered customer support because these programs allow customers to efficiently obtain
remedies without the costs and hassles of traditional claims processes.”); Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-and-e-commerce/ (“[T]oday nearly as
many Americans have made purchases directly through social media platforms as had engaged in any
type of online purchasing behavior 16 years ago.”).
21. For instance, where effective constraints are already in place due to social forces or practical
factors, regulatory action may be less necessary. This suggestion implicates a rich literature on the
respective capacities of state versus market and other social forces. For instance, law and development
scholars have explored the circumstances under which state actors or private actors might be best
positioned to address a policy problem, and the circumstances in which particular forms or coordination might be required. See, e.g., David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)
(discussing the historical academic literature on the dynamic of states versus markets in development);
Pranab Bardhan, State Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature, 54 J.
ECON. LIT. 862, 862 (2016) (surveying literature on the role of state versus other actors in development). I am grateful to Martin Sybblis for helping me see the connection between this Article’s model
and that literature.
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Part IV considers potential objections to this model and addresses
several ways in which it could be refined in future research. In the generalized form presented here, the model lumps together constraints that may
operate differently on various sorts of consumers, merchants, or transactions. An online advance procured on a mobile device through an app that
could be accessed by children may (or should) be subject to different constraints than a traditional loan applied for in-person by adults.22 Further
work should refine and customize this model to fit each individual situation. It should be revisited to accommodate each point in time, each type
of merchant or consumer, and each type of commercial transaction or relationship.
This aspect of the model underscores a broader principle concerning
the law and policy of consumer commercial relationships, which is too
often forgotten or neglected: there are unlikely to be one-size-fits-all analyses or conclusions in this area. To the contrary, to develop appropriate
policies we must pursue refined and layered consideration of consumers,
the merchants, and the commercial relationships they seek. Additionally,
we must consider the changes in the social, technical, and legal contexts
of those relationships. Accordingly, this Article endeavors to provide a
framework for considering the comprehensive sociolegal and technological context in which consumers and merchants transact.
I. A MODEL OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM
A. The Model
This Part lays out the basic premises and structure of the consumer
protection ecosystem model. This model emphasizes that consumer protection, as experienced by participants in consumer commerce, has a scope
that is delineated not just by governing law but also by the actual feasibility
of particular actions23—both as a technical matter (i.e., the tools to engage
in the transaction are reasonably available24) and as a social matter
(i.e., the activities are socially acceptable). As discussed further below,
this Article does not argue or analyze whether or not participants should

22. The problem of children engaging in unauthorized financial transactions for a caregiver’s
phone has already caused problems for major technology companies. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt & Brian
X. Chen, Apple to Refund App Store Purchases Made Without Parental Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/technology/government-and-apple-settle-childrensapp-purchase-inquiry.html.
23. For the concept of an “effective scope” of laws, see Surden, supra note 15 which, distinguishes effective scope from positive scope and provides a theoretical framework. Professor Surden
explored similar ideas in his prior work, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1605–
10 (2007).
24. For a similarly broad definition of “technology,” see, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as
Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 85 (2013) (“[T]he term ‘technology’ can . . . be defined more
broadly as ‘useful knowledge about how to produce things at low cost.” (quoting WILLIAM EASTERLY,
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE
TROPICS 150 (2001)). As explained further below in Subsection 3, my definition of “technically feasible” actions includes the cost of the relevant tools or actions.
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or should not be barred from particular activities. There is a range of reasonable views on such questions, and this model does not force a choice
because it can accommodate that entire range. This model is limited to the
descriptive issues of what consumer protection is, what is actually protected, and what happens to that protection when the world changes.

Figure 1.

The model may be laid out as follows. Start with the universe of all
possible actions that participants might take regarding a consumer commercial relationship. These actions include: (1) the communications between the parties in the process of advertising and negotiation, including
disclosures, conditions, and warranties; (2) the actions taken entering into
the transaction, including indications of consent and agreement; (3) the
actions taken to comply with or enforce the terms of the transaction, including payment, delivery, repossession, foreclosure, or other means of
pursuing relief upon default; and (4) the various ancillary actions such as
the later commercial use of information gained in an earlier interaction
(e.g., sale of customer information to a data broker). These are the actions
under consideration by the model. The entire inside area of the perimeter
rectangle of Figure 1 represents the universe of such actions.25
1. Legal Constraints
First, consider the set of such actions that are legally feasible (as labeled in Figure 1 above). Legal feasibility refers to actions that fall afoul
of enforced legal prohibitions and bring penalties sufficient to deter parties
from engaging in them. The boundaries of this area represent the existing
body of legal constraints on actions that can be taken in consumer commercial relationships.
25. The size of the respective areas of the Venn diagram are not drawn to any scale. Future
research could estimate and render some of the areas proportionately to one another, though such
estimates would remain somewhat speculative, as explained in the rest of this Part of the Article. In
any case, the insights of the model laid out in this Article can be understood from the model as depicted
here.
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Legal constraints can be conceived broadly, including ex ante regulation as well as ex post enforcement actions by private litigants and public
officials. Legal constraints include a large body of law and regulation at
the federal and state levels. Relevant laws include not just substantive liability rules but also rules concerning jurisdiction, standing, remedies, and
so on, which are integral parts of the legal regime in place at a given time.
Legal constraints in this model also include the institutions—agencies,
courts, lawyers, and others26—that are responsible for the determination,
evaluation, or resolution of legal rights and disputes. Note that while this
model is one of “consumer protection,” which implies protection from a
consumer’s commercial counterparties, merchants are not the only participants subject to restriction. Consumers are barred from taking certain actions, too, out of concern for merchants or, paternalistically, to protect consumers from themselves.27
For an action to be legally feasible, it must either (1) not be prohibited
by law (defined broadly as any law or regulation, at any jurisdictional
level, to which the party is subject); or (2) not be subject to effective enforcement, whether because violations are difficult to detect, because penalties are insufficiently likely to be imposed, or because the penalties are
insufficiently severe, when imposed, to actually deter the prohibited conduct.
Prohibition is not enough on its own. A party may be prohibited from
taking certain otherwise-profitable actions under governing law, but if prohibitions are not enforced, or the sanctions are low, the rules are unlikely
to deter the action. For example, scholars have noted that banks foreclosing on homeowners who are in default frequently retain contractors who
have allegedly committed a wide variety of illegal acts without facing
meaningful sanction.28 Such prohibited, but undeterred, “bad behavior” is
a primary focus of consumer policy analysis. Fierce debates revolve
around the availability of statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, class actions,
26. For instance, state and federal lawmakers; regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, state attorneys general; public interest organizations; the
private bar; and judges. Consumer law is effectively surveyed in RICHARD M. ALDERMAN & DEE
PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2019).
27. Much of consumer law and policy is driven by paternalistic concern for consumers misjudging situations—making decisions adversely affecting their own welfare in ways thought inefficient or unjust. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 18, at 160–98; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1255, 1347 (2002); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1316 (2013) (“The metagoals of consumer law include consumer decisional autonomy in the marketplace; market transactions that optimize consumer welfare; and intraconsumer fairness, particularly
for disadvantaged consumers.” (citations omitted)). Of course, as noted elsewhere, there are other
justifications, including reducing externalities imposed on society as a result of particular transactions,
and correcting perceived distributive problems. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 4, 26;
PETERSON, supra note 18 at 200–30 (citing various justifications of regulation and “social costs” of
high debt); Engel & McCoy, supra, at 1262 (noting distributive justice and externality concerns in
mortgage lending).
28. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1157–60 (2016).
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and other devices intended to aid injured consumers.29 Legal prohibitions
often act as true constraints only when paired with these heightened sanctions and enforcement structures.
As with other constraints, legal constraints do not usually circumscribe actions as definitively as the clear line circumscribing this area in
the diagram might suggest. Prohibition and enforcement, and ultimately
deterrence, will be matters of degree. This important fact is considered
further in Part IV.
2. Social Constraints
Second, consider the set of socially feasible actions (as labeled in
Figure 1), those (1) for which public responsibility cannot be avoided, and
(2) which, if known, would not be considered so contrary to governing
norms of social behavior that a party wouldn’t undertake them.30 The first
element acknowledges that there are many actions that parties take behind
closed doors that affect consumer commercial relationships but that are
unlikely to ever be revealed. Some actions might draw social opprobrium
if known, but parties engage in them because the risk of disclosure is low.
The second element acknowledges that it is society’s reaction that determines the level of deterrence produced by a given norm.
As with legal acceptability, it is not the case that an action is either
socially acceptable or not—this is not a purely dichotomous condition.
Some actions are vaguely distasteful but profitable enough to be worth the
reputational cost. A rational merchant might decide to “hold its nose” and
partake in such actions anyway. Such actions are socially feasible under
this model because the model focuses on actions that are actually deterred
by the threat of reputational harm.31
Social science literature on reputation has emphasized its power particularly in “close-knit” societies.32 Drawing from these insights, legal

29. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 83 (discussing and collecting sources discussing statutory
damages); id. at 72 (discussing and collecting sources concerning class actions and consumer protection).
30. On what is meant by “norms,” see ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 127. Basically, they are
“rules that emanate . . . from social forces.” Id. In the social world studied by Ellickson (ranchers in
Shasta County), the norms could be discerned from the fact that ranchers described them to him, that
they actually abided by them, and that they “regularly punished, with gossip and ultimately with violent self-help, ranchers who failed to control their cattle.” Id. at 130. Violent self-help is less common
in the consumer context, but gossip in the form of reputational attacks on the Internet (sometimes in
“violent” language) is a similar means of enforcing such norms.
31. Such actions could be mapped as close to the edge of the relevant circle, near what should
be imagined as a blurry line at the edge of each oval.
32. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 143, 166.
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scholars have suggested that formal legal sanctions take on greater importance where social bonds are weak.33 The classic example is the weaker
social bonds of large cities as opposed to small towns.34
These insights are applicable to consumer transactions. Earlier work
on consumer commerce has confirmed that traditional brick-and-mortar
firms care about reputation among what often amounts to the “small town”
of their customer base.35 They are more responsive to consumer complaints and interests than would be expected if their primary concern were
only legal sanctions (e.g., warranty claims).36 These firms have long supported organizations such as the Better Business Bureau, to demonstrate
and bolster their credibility with consumers.37 Today, large and stable
firms doing business online attend to their reputation in a similar fashion.38
Established businesses, reliant on repeat customers and on reputation, are
sensitive to social constraints—although, they too occasionally violate social norms and legal rules.39

33. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 39 n.15 (“[L]ack of a prospective long-term future
relationship makes disputants less likely to resolve their differences without the help of third parties,
and hence more likely to resort to legal and political action.”); id. at 94 (providing a summary chart).
34. Id. at 253.
35. Id. at 141–43 (discussing academic literature).
36. Id.; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443–50 (2010) examining the impact of market forces, including reputational
concerns, on firms’ decisions to redesign products); id. at 1449 (“[L]arge firms tend to be especially
concerned about their reputation for safety because they often offer multiple product lines and have
long time horizons.”). There is a much broader literature in the business world concerning the importance of reputation for most traditional firms. See, e.g., Eugene W. Anderson, Claes Fornell, &
Sanal K. Mazvancheryl, Customer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value, 68 J. MARKETING 172, 183
(2004) (finding a positive association between reputation with customers and shareholder value). Anne
Fleming has documented various relevant practices among “fringe financiers” in twentieth century
New York. Compare ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE 158–59
(2018) (discussing the effective use of “grassroots protest” against Harlem merchants), with id. at 175
(noting the difficulty of enforcing consumer protective regulations or applying social pressure to “flyby-night” merchants and lenders, including those represented by “door-to-door” sellers), and id. at
145 (noting that consumers seeking remedies against door-to-door sellers of goods faced the often
insuperable barrier of having to “track[ ] down a door-to-door seller to serve notice of the lawsuit”).
37. See, e.g., id. at 150 (discussing the Better Business Bureau and noting its limitations); JAKE
HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE UNDERWORLD 103–05 (2014)
(discussing ease of appeasing the Better Business Bureau’s complaint process without substantive
compliance with regulations).
38. CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 186–87 (2017) (noting that critique of American Express’s use of customer data caused a change in course).
39. See infra note 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the example of Wells Fargo). My
treatment of this subject is, by necessity, brief. The issue deserves fuller treatment. There are some
countervailing factors that might lead established companies to be more abusive of consumers. For
instance, companies under distress will discount potential future business very aggressively and, thus,
may be more willing to abuse current customers at the cost of future business. Or merchants may treat
customers less well if they know those customers are “locked-in,” i.e., reluctant to switch to a new,
unfamiliar merchant unless extremely unhappy. See, e.g., DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION:
HOW CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES AMERICAN PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2018) (discussing empirical evidence of such lock-in).
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By contrast, one might expect reputational constraints to be significantly loosened in a less close-knit commercial environment.40 In that respect, the Internet is far bigger than the biggest city. The Internet lowers
the barriers to entry of any new actor, and permits anyone, anywhere in
the world, to engage in business with online consumers across the globe.
Many transactions are now completed with one-off merchant counterparties about whom the consumer has little information.41 Also, current U.S.
business law permits cheap, easy, low-disclosure creation of limited liability entities.42 Some merchants (e.g., some shadowy online lenders) may
be essentially disposable entities, used to engage in activities that their actual (hidden) principals might not want to undertake publicly in their own
names.43 Because these actors care little about their reputation, social
forces only marginally impact them. Disposable entities can be easily
abandoned if negative public opinion overtakes them and hurts their business prospects. Then, the same business can be reborn under a different
name with a reputationally “clean slate.” For such entities, the realm of
socially feasible actions may be quite broad.44
40. Notice, however, that “close-knit” does not always refer to geographical closeness at a particular time. For example, Ellickson provides an extended discussion of whaling norms, maintained
despite the relatively far-flung activities of the various participants in the industry. ELLICKSON, supra
note 15, at 191–206. But, of course, the parties have to see benefits in cooperation, and other conditions
have to be met for such order to emerge.
41. I do not mean to suggest this is an entirely new problem; lenders have long used numerous
evasions—including changing names and locations as needed—to escape regulatory and social sanction. Professor Fleming provides numerous, rich accounts of lenders using different corporate identities and (pretended) location to evade regulations and obscure the actors actually behind consumer
lending transactions. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 36, at 27, 56. But the problem seems particularly
acute in the online world, where the marketplace is global, and masking identity is very easy.
42. See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 533–37 (2017) (presenting basic aspects and history of limited liability companies (LLCs) under modern business entity law); Patricia Cohen, Need to Hide Some Income? You
Don’t Have to Go to Panama, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/business/need-to-hide-some-income-you-dont-have-to-go-to-panama.html (noting minimal Delaware
LLC disclosure laws).
43. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 28 (noting that some consumers intentionally select
merchants at the lower end of the market, but may not take account of lower-quality contract design
features selected by “sellers” who are “undeterred (or less deterred) by the threat of a reputational
penalty”); HALPERN, supra note 37, at 168 (recounting concerns of New York state regulator that
companies would simply “reopen somewhere else under a different name,” to obtain lighter regulation); id. at 221 (providing examples of the rapid closing and reopening of businesses under new name
or in new location); PETERSON, supra note 18, at 135 (“[B]ecause entry and exit costs are low for highcost creditors, the market is inundated with fly-by-night businesses that make only minor investments
in reputational capital and other sunk costs. Because many high-cost lenders do not invest time and
effort in building solid reputations, they have little to fear from word-of-mouth criticism.” (footnote
omitted)).
44. BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 165 (noting that problems “in the subprime mortgage market”
including the lack of “repeat business, as a single borrower takes few mortgage loans and a relatively
long time passes between loans,” as well as “the opening of the market [by the rise of securitization]
to fly-by-night originators with little reputation to lose and insufficient incentives to build a reputation”); see, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 27, at 1289–90 (contrasting “[b]anks and thrifts,” which
are “community institutions with valuable reputations,” with “[p]redatory lenders [who] are less concerned about their reputations because they are simply conduits, not community institutions,” and who
“can readily dissolve and re-emerge in the same communities under different names”); id. at 1353
(discussing “fly-by-night operations” of some predatory lenders, who have “little capitalization” and
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Finally, due to technological developments, online merchants may be
able to prevent consumers from becoming aware of certain practices. For
instance, consumers have not yet caught on that merchants are using advanced technological tools to set pricing, anticipate consumer needs and
desires, and otherwise leverage Big Data to ensure that transactions take
place on the most advantageous terms possible for the merchant.45
On the other hand, new forms of social constraint have begun to
emerge that may affect this state of affairs. Social media and online review
sites may be able to provide some “bite” to reputation—even in a changed
world.46 These online platforms can serve effectively as forms of pervasive
public surveillance of businesses. How best to cultivate, or constrain, these
and other policy tools deserves further exploration.47
In sum, social constraints may have diminished in some arenas—particularly one-off, purely online transactions with unknown or anonymous
counterparties—and thus, new areas of permitted action may have opened;
in others, the realm of social acceptability has narrowed thanks to the public scrutiny facilitated by the Internet.48 But in all cases, it is an important
factor affecting merchant and consumer behavior, and one that merits particularized policy attention.
3. Technical Constraints
Third, consider the set of technically feasible actions (as labeled in
Figure 1), which are those that, as of a particular moment in time, are
(1) technologically possible and (2) can be deployed in a cost-effective

“can dissolve and reincorporate, sometimes in other states, practically overnight”); cf. Engel &
McCoy, supra note 27, at 1296 (“Some banks and thrifts, whose direct lending is legitimate, have
subsidiaries and affiliates that employ predatory lending practices.”). Professor Odinet has provided
an additional example of when reputational constraints can be ineffective: when the market has collapsed and there is no need to worry about obtaining future business. See CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET,
FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN
AMERICA 55 (2019) (“[T]here was very little market incentive for servicers of subprime [mortgage]
loans to do a great job for reputational reasons. One would think that having a good name on Wall
Street would lead to future servicing businesses. However, in the wake of the crash this was simply
not the case. . . . Because the business model of servicing subprime loans was essentially headed down
the toilet, there was no reason to compete for future business—and thus no real reason to strive for
excellent in servicing the loans that were quickly going into default.”). This issue is discussed in
greater detail at infra Part IV.A, where I acknowledge that a path for future work is to distinguish what
laws and policies might be appropriate for different types of merchants, in part based on their different
levels of responsiveness to sanctions, including reputational/social sanctions.
45. Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1311, 1347–49 (2015).
46. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 569–71
(2016). The potential for such tools was foreseen by ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 285 writing in 1991
that “recent advances in data processing make it easier to store and retrieve truthful public-record
information about a person’s previous failures to cooperate. . . . [T]he improved circulation of accurate
reputational information can deter fly-by-night opportunism.”
47. See, e.g., Arbel, supra note 19. Professor Arbel provides a skeptical view of the effectiveness of technology-driven reputation constraints absent regulatory intervention, and proposes convincing “fixes” for this market failure.
48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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manner in consumer transactions. The set excludes acts that are not technologically possible (e.g., reading your mind to assess your willingness to
repay a loan you have applied for); or that are possible but too expensive
or inconvenient to be worth it (e.g., interviewing your friends and family
to ascertain your intentions regarding repayment).
Stated differently, the boundaries—the circumference—of that ellipse represent technical constraints on commerce.49 These constraints
have nothing to do with the legality of actions, or the state of the law; nor
do they involve social acceptability and the reputational effects of engaging in a course of action. Instead, these constraints involve only whether a
market participant, independent of regulation and social context, might
find them cost-effective pursuits. Unlike legal and social constraints, technical constraints may not even be recognized as constraints until technology has already overcome them—in other words, until technology shifts
the boundaries of what we consider “possible,” we might not have realized
what we were missing. Perhaps the world would be better if more of those
technical constraints were surmounted. This is plausible with respect to
many forms of technical limitation. But even desirable shifts have complex and important implications for policy.
The category of technical constraints is intended to be broad. It is
helpful to consider not just “advanced” technological actions, such as procuring Big Data about consumer behavior on the Internet. Rudimentary
technologies—many of which have been around for decades, such as telemarketing, bar codes, and even adhesion contracts—remain relevant
technologies in setting the scope of feasible acts in consumer commerce.50
Often, technologies developed for other purposes end up having unintended but important effects on commercial transacting. For example, advances in data storage and computer networking have provided merchants
and consumers with greater access to banking records (such as images of
49. The use of the term “technical” at many points in this Article is intended to indicate that
some of the constraints might not be what is colloquially thought of as “technological” but rather
natural/physical, in nature. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 24, at 85 (defining “technology” broadly to
include production knowledge). Globalization, for instance, can be thought of as a loosening of “technological constraints” in the form of increasingly more efficiently organized long-distance commercial
networks (it also, of course, relies on relaxed legal constraints). Professor Surden has provided a more
thoroughly elaborated analytical framework concerning “non-legal regulatory devices”; for instance,
he uses the more general term “structural constraints” to mean roughly what I term “technical constraints,” and then he subdivides that category in interesting ways. See generally Surden, supra note
23, at 1606–08; see also Surden, supra note 15, at 138 (“This Article proposes the term ‘Technological
Cost’ to capture how activities can be implicitly constrained by limitations inherent to technological
processes of the past.”).
50. Christopher G. Bradley, Disrupting Secured Transactions, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 1028
n.177 (2019) (discussing importance of bar code); Bradley, supra note 3, at 78–79 (noting that technological changes can take considerable time to impact markets and social norms). It has been aptly
said that “technological revolutions do not get interesting socially until they are boring technologically.” Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 47 (2014) (citing Clay Shirky, How Social Media Can Make History, TED (June
2019),
http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_history/transcript (stating that online “tools don't get socially interesting until they get technologically
boring”)).
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deposited checks and payment histories); ease of access, in turn, has had
numerous important effects on the financial system, for good or ill.51
Finally, in this category, there is a special case that should be considered: an action that is technically possible for one party but is easily countermanded by technology available to the other party.52 An example is the
pop-up advertisements generated by Internet websites.53 These ads were
sufficiently effective as to become widespread, but they also caused great
annoyance to consumers, who commonly found themselves unable to
close websites because of an endless proliferation of pop-ups. Then, blockers of these ads were developed and became widespread, such that pop-up
ads may no longer be considered a technically feasible option because they
are so widely and easily thwarted.54 As will be discussed in later sections
of this Article, consideration of such countermeasures is a way in which
this model can be refined for the analysis of particular fact scenarios.
B. Reading the Model
The fundamental principle of this model, stated in plain language, is
this: Only if an act is technically, legally, and socially feasible will a participant engage in it. Consumers are effectively “protected” from all other
acts.
This principle can be represented as in Figure 2 below. Let legally
feasible actions be defined as the area FL, technically feasible actions be
defined as the area FT, and socially feasible actions be defined as the area
FS. The scope of permitted actions is defined as the area at the intersection
of these three types of feasibility: PA. In other words, as shown below,
PA = FL ∧ FT ∧ FS.

51. Bradley, supra note 3, at 72, 92–94 (discussing literature on effect of technologically tethered consumer finance activity on those lacking digital literacy).
52. Some of the relevant issues are discussed well by Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of
Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1152–53, 1156, 1220 (2006).
53. See, e.g., John Herrman, Google Chrome Now Blocks Irksome Ads. That’s a Good Thing,
Right?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/business/media/googlechrome-ad-block.html (describing Internet advertising that is easily thwarted by ad-blocking software).
54. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 70–
71 (2014) (discussing antitracking technologies); Klint Finley, Google's New Ad Blocker Changed
The Web Before It Even Switched On, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/google-chrome-ad-blocker-change-web/ (noting that a 2016 survey
“found that about 26 percent of web users had installed ad-blockers on their computers,” and that
Google Chrome’s default blocking of some pop-up ads may be intended to stop users from installing
more aggressive products that threaten Google’s own advertising revenue); Herrman, supra note 53
(describing Google’s imposition of default pop-up detection and blocking software in its Chrome
browsers).
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Figure 2.

The most obvious and important observation emerging from Figures 1 and 2 is that consumers are protected by social, technical, and legal
constraints. This model is a realist one because it focuses on the broader
social and practical realities, wherein legal prohibitions and institutions
play important but limited roles.55
A simple example from recent headlines: It is technically possible to
open bank accounts for large numbers of customers without their permission, as Wells Fargo has admitted doing.56 But it is both unlawful and socially unacceptable to do so. As noted, however, social and legal sanctions
deter behavior only when the behavior is likely to become known. Wells
Fargo’s conduct went undetected for a considerable length of time, and
those engaging in this conduct may have assumed that it would remain
undiscovered. Because Wells Fargo’s conduct was revealed and has been
heavily sanctioned, future market participants are likely to be deterred for
both social and legal reasons.57
The key premise of this realist model of the consumer protection ecosystem is that, whether recognized or not, technical and social constraints
form a crucial part of the boundary of the effective scope of actions that

55. This insight has been demonstrated amply in the work of social science-oriented scholars,
see, e.g., infra note 36, but has not sufficiently been taken into account in consumer protection discussions.
56. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargofined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
57. See id. (describing sanctions); Matt Egan, Wells Fargo's Scandals Are Hurting Its Bottom
Line, CNN BUSINESS (July 13, 2018, 11:04 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/13/news/companies/wells-fargo-earnings-stock/index.html.
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participants in consumer transactions may take at a given time. A constraint is a constraint.58 All forms of constraint constitute important aspects
of “consumer protection.”
This is not to say that each type of constraint operates in the same
way. Technical constraints may take the form of an arms race or a cat-andmouse game as parties develop technical capacities that essentially cancel
each other out—or at least dampen the effects of new tools.59 Violations
of legal constraints may be subject to different norms or beliefs than technical ones. Willful, public violation of a legal constraint may be viewed in
some cases as the product of an intentional and legitimate political or expressive act, and may even lead to legal change. Alternatively, such an
action may be viewed with intensified social opprobrium because it is not
only wrong but also illegal.60 Other nuances regarding these different constraints are discussed in Part IV.A below. This area is another aspect of the
model that is ripe for refinement, particularly by interdisciplinary research.
C. A Taxonomy of Consumer Commercial Actions and Constraints
The model presented above permits a taxonomy of potential actions
to be made, and allows for analysis of the relationship between these different constraints on consumer commerce. Figure 3 depicts the complex
interrelationships among these constraints. Each area within the Venn diagram presents a distinct unit of analysis. I provide real-world examples
of actions in each area below.

Figure 3.

58. To put it in the famous words of proto-legal realist Oliver Wendell Holmes, these are all
constraints that would operate on “the bad man.” See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897).
59. The law has been characterized, similarly, as a “tug of war,” as it is perceived to have gone
too far in one direction or the other and as changing political tides take it one direction of another.
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 11.
60. See supra note 15 and accompanying test (discussing “code as law”); see supra Part II.A.1.
(discussing the literature on the special features of (il)legality as a particular type of constraint).
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The areas within the Venn diagram are as follows:
Area 1: Actions that are outside the bounds of legal, social, and
technical feasibility.
Area 2: Actions that are legal but neither socially acceptable
nor technically feasible.
Area 3: Actions that are socially acceptable and legal but are
not technically feasible.
Area 4: Actions that are legally and technically feasible but are
not socially acceptable.
Area 5: Actions that are socially acceptable but are neither legally nor technically feasible.
Area 6: Actions that are socially and technically feasible but are
illegal.
Area 7: Actions that are technically feasible but are neither socially acceptable nor legal.
Area 8: Actions that are legal, socially acceptable, and technically feasible.
There is room for judgment in determining which area a given action
falls in. There may be differences of opinion in whether a given action is
actually socially acceptable (given the different communities that might
be called upon to judge it), or legally feasible (given the varied legal regimes and enforcement possibilities), or even technically feasible (given
the degrees to which parties’ technical capacities might differ). But even
if they are contestable, examples in each category helpfully illuminate the
scope and variety of what this model includes.
Area 1: Actions that are outside the bounds of legal, social, and technical feasibility.
At first glance, this might seem to be a fanciful category. It is difficult
to look prospectively and predict what will become feasible as a matter of
later technical, legal, or social change. However, helpful examples can be
found if searched for retrospectively and with the benefit of hindsight.
A simple thought experiment helps give the category meaning. Consider an advertiser who wishes to gain direct, near-real-time access to vast
amounts of highly personal information about an individual and her
friends. This advertiser wants the information to discover, for instance, the
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week that the individual learns she is pregnant to sell her pregnancy-related products (and peddle her information to others).61 In the late 1990s
or early 2000s, it would have been unlawful, socially unacceptable, and
technically infeasible to do such a thing. However, such data-mining activities are commonplace today thanks to a variety of legal, social, and
technical changes.62 Now, such behavior may be in Area 8 (for better or
worse). But not too long ago, it would have been in Area 1. It is difficult
to predict what the next battlegrounds might be, but they may be as unpredictable to us now as Big Data was a few decades ago.
Area 2: Actions that are legal but neither socially acceptable nor
technically feasible.
Again, it is difficult to propose plausible examples that are not currently technically feasible. However, one example is the use of credit reports and credit scores in commonplace, small-scale commercial transactions. Trade vendors such as plumbers or locksmiths often extend unsecured credit by providing services and receiving payment or invoicing the
customer afterwards. While consumers expect their credit to matter for
large purchases, they would resist a check in advance of a visit for a routine
service call. Such checks would be legal, but likely socially unacceptable.
These checks might not be technically feasible either, at least for
small home repair businesses. It would be relatively expensive and cumbersome to perform a credit check over the phone prior to dispatching
workers to each service call. Performing a check after the fact would be
too late, because the call’s expense would have already been incurred.
Thus, such a credit check, while lawful, would likely be both socially
unacceptable and—for the moment—technically infeasible. One could,
however, imagine this type of check becoming both more technically feasible and socially acceptable in the future.
Area 3: Actions that are socially acceptable and legal but are not
technically feasible.

61. See Sarah Gray, One Woman’s Attempt to Hide her Pregnancy from Big Data—It’s More
Difficult Than You’d Expect, SALON (Apr. 29, 2014, 2:45 AM), https://www.salon.com/2014/04/28/one_womans_attempt_to_hide_her_pregnancy_from_big_data/ (noting that
“[t]o marketers, the average Joe's online data is worth around 10 cents. However, a pregnant woman's
data is worth fifteen times that: $1.50”).
62. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), https://nyti.ms/AyNgCY (discussing Target’s aggressive use of data procurement and analytics
in determining pregnancy status of customers, but also noting Target’s sensitivity to the potential public-relations risks and some potential legal risks of their strategies); Rachel Emma Silverman, Bosses
Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers Might Get Sick, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/bosses-harness-big-data-to-predict-which-workers-might-get-sick-1455664940 (last updated
Feb. 18, 2016) (“Employee wellness firms and insurers are working with companies to mine data about
the prescription drugs workers use, how they shop and even whether they vote, to predict their individual health needs and recommend treatments.”).
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These are actions that merchants and consumers are merely waiting
for technology companies to facilitate. Drone-based product deliveries63
and virtual-reality shopping64 (or even virtual fitting of clothes65) provide
ready examples. These actions currently lie on the other side of the border
of technical feasibility but may cross to our side soon. Once the technical
solution is found, legal and social barriers are unlikely to influence adoption (although whether they will catch on is a business question).
Area 4: Actions that are legally and technically feasible but are not
socially acceptable.
This category includes actions that are only constrained by social
norms. Some might assume that the law would prohibit most socially unacceptable acts and that examples of this category would be hard to find.
In fact, there are many. Consider when airline employees had a doctor
dragged off an overbooked United Airlines flight after he had taken his
seat. Passengers recorded his forcible removal and quickly posted those
videos on social media.66 While the actions of the airline were technically
feasible, and at least arguably in accord with governing law, the ensuing
firestorm of bad publicity made clear that the act was over the bounds of
social acceptability—and, in the age of mobile devices and viral videos, it
could not be hidden from public view. As a reminder, the category of socially permitted actions is defined to include actions that would draw disapproval if known, but that can be concealed. As this example shows, certain actions may be rendered more discoverable over time, particularly
with the rise of social media, easy data-sharing, and camera-phones. Accordingly, the scope of acceptable actions may constrict.
By contrast, some consumer protection experts are skeptical of the
disciplining effects of reputation in the world of Big Data because companies can successfully mask their actions, divert consumer attention, and
avoid criticism. For instance, retailers have become adept at masking their
tailored, surveillance-based advertising and marketing efforts at just below
the threshold of what consumers might find alarming.67 Some retailers
seeking to determine optimal prices for profit maximization have pursued
63. Jeremy Lin & P.W. Singer, Meet China's Growing Fleet of Automated Delivery Drones,
POPULAR SCIENCE (July 3, 2018), https://www.popsci.com/china-drone-deliveries (“Alibaba, China's
largest e-commerce firm, is already making drone deliveries in Shanghai.”).
64. Anthony Soohoo, Walmart.com to Introduce New Home Shopping Features: 3D Virtual
Shopping Tour and “Buy The Room”, WALLMART (June 27, 2018), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2018/06/27/walmart-com-to-introduce-new-home-shopping-features3d-virtual-shopping-tour-and-buy-the-room.
65. See 4D Movies Capture People in Clothing, Create Realistic Virtual Try-On, MAX PLANCK
INST. FOR INTELLIGENT SYS. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.is.mpg.de/news/4d-movies-capture-peoplein-clothing-creating-realistic-virtual-try-on (discussing “ClothCap,” or “clothing capture” technology
that uses video-obtained analysis of clothing data to assess sizing and fit).
66. Camila Domonoske, Passenger Forcibly Removed from United Flight, Prompting Outcry,
NPR
(Apr.
10,
2017,
12:50
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/04/10/523275494/passenger-forcibly-removed-from-united-flight-prompting-outcry.
67. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 45 at 1322, 1348 (offering the example of Target responding
to criticism by masking its Big Data advertising to maintain it “under the threshold of awareness”).
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highly technical, and privacy-invasive, strategies: “Mass retailers continually fine-tune their pricing algorithms through advanced behavioral datamining operations. They film customers’ in-store movements, compile
loyalty card data, and conduct many randomized controlled trials that easily provide statistical significance across thousands of stores and millions
of transactions.”68 Retailers using these or a panoply of other Big Data
tools may eventually draw the ire of consumers—or, alternatively, be
viewed as perfectly acceptable if privacy norms continue to erode.69 For
now, these retailers’ actions remain unknown to, or poorly understood by,
the general public, and are not socially constrained.
A final point: as the diagram itself handily reflects, there is a shared
border between this area and Area 8 (the actions that are legally, technologically, and socially feasible). It may be the case that a way for a company to “game” the line between these two areas is to switch to a more
socially acceptable practice after the fact and on a case-by-case basis, only
for the benefit of customers who complain. Thus, as scholars have noted,
businesses can use “the customer service department as a site of displaced
bargaining about the less salient terms of adhesive contract,” such as exorbitant late fees or interest charges.70 When such gambits are successful,
businesses can be thought of as having successfully evaded constraint in
all but the relatively few instances of customers challenging it.
Area 5: Actions that are socially acceptable but are neither legally
nor technically feasible.
One example of this type of action is in the sphere of online comparison shopping and competition for provision of financial services. Remarkably, price comparison platforms are often barred from gathering
price information from merchants offering goods on the Internet both due
to laws and due to technological obstacles erected by sellers of goods.71
Similarly, “legacy” financial institutions have erected technical barriers
and cited legal prohibitions to bar innovative financial services providers
68. Id. at 1322 (“Retailers track micro-behavioral patterns such as variations in consumers’
price sensitivity by item at different times in different stores and adju, st prices accordingly. Online
retailers also selectively charge consumers higher prices by, for example, profiling operating systems
and tracking purchase history.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1345 (“Using technology that shows where
the eye is looking, retailers have determined where most consumers naturally look when they walk
down an aisle . . . [R]etailers can anchor the consumer at a higher price so that subsequent items appear
cheaper by comparison.”).
69. See generally id. at 1331–33. Professor Van Loo’s article is a fascinating compendium of
examples of how technology has enabled all sorts of new forms of merchant behavior.
70. Van Loo, supra note 46, at 280 (discussing consumers who are likely to receive the superior
treatment afford to “squeaky wheel” customers). I am grateful to Professor Van Loo for helping me
see the relationship of this scholarship to business practices at the Area 4/Area 8 border.
71. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 837 (2019) (“Counterintuitively in the information age, businesses can block access to market information that exists
openly on the web, such as Amazon’s or airlines’ prices. … Online sellers have used the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and other laws to forbid third parties from digitally collecting such
information.” (internal footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 836–45 (describing the range of “legal and
market battlegrounds” on which would-be new “digital intermediaries” have had to fight to obtain
access to new markets).
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from accessing customer account information; thus, they have hindered
startup financial technology (FinTech) companies from competing with
them.72 These technical and legal constraints hinder new competitors from
activities that would otherwise be acceptable.
A more controversial example of this category is merchants who
would take actions adverse to some socially disfavored but legally protected part of the population—if they could readily distinguish members
of that group. Such a merchant might not be subject to any social sanction
in the area they are located or from the community of their customers. But
implementing this policy would be illegal and would also present technical
difficulties.73 Of course, some businesses might find a way of sorting potential customers into the disfavored group. In that situation, where the
discrimination is both technically and socially feasible, legal protection
attains its greatest importance because it is the only remaining constraint.
That situation falls in Area 6, considered immediately below.
Area 6: Actions that are socially and technically feasible but are
illegal.
This category includes actions that are prohibited by law but that the
general public would not understand the abusiveness of, or would not consider problematic because the law protects a socially disfavored part of the
population (as in the last example above).
This category also includes actions that are illegal but should not
be—that is, actions prohibited by vestigial regulations that are in need of
repeal. Some businesses in the “gig economy,” such as Uber and AirBnb,

72. See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA.
L. REV. 232, 242–43 (2018) (describing barriers to entry imposed by “legacy” firms, including use of
dominant market positions and of laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which were
intended to protect customer data against misuse rather than protect banks from competition); id. at
261–64 (noting antitrust implications of legacy firms’ conduct).
73. Consider discrimination on the basis of categories such as religion or sexual orientation that
may be relatively difficult to detect in a particular customer. There are probably merchants (similar to
the baker in the recent Supreme Court case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights.
Comm’n, who would discriminate against members of these various protected classes if possible, despite such conduct being unlawful under federal, state, and local law(s). 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)). But
such merchants often have no idea whether many of their customers fall into the class, and in most
instances, no ready way of finding out. Such merchants are both legally and technically constrained
from taking an action that—to them—would not be barred by social constraints or fear of reputational
harm. This is an important example to reinforce a point emphasized below. See infra Part III.A. Social
acceptability may constrain some but not all merchants in a community, and so to some degree the
model’s analysis has to be customized to consider different subcommunities or simply different degrees of responsiveness to this form of constraint (which sometimes may be more and sometimes less
cutting than legal constraints). Also, consider the party harmed by the merchant discussed here: It
would be of limited comfort to the would-be customers in Masterpiece Cakeshop to tell them that
while the business they tried to purchase a wedding cake from had the technical ability to discriminate
against them, many businesses (their local paint supply store or tire shop or whatever) would be constrained from doing so by being unable to discern their sexual orientation in time to refuse to deal with
them. Thus the type of transaction and the characteristics of the protected consumers may vary, too,
in ways worth disaggregating in order to reach good policy results.
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have disregarded arguably outdated taxi licensing laws, and have been met
with considerable business success.74
On a more old-fashioned note, it is technically feasible for a company
to send collectors dressed as Zorro to harass debtors in arrears, and it is
socially acceptable to do so in some communities—including Spain.75 But
it is decidedly not legal (any more76) in the United States,77 even if it might
be technically possible and even, perhaps, socially acceptable.
In fact, this category may include many of the contentious areas of
consumer finance in recent years.78 The ways in which interest payments
are calculated, credit-insurance products are sold, disclosures are crafted,
and various penalties and costs are applied, are sufficiently complex that
the public may struggle to understand them, much less be outraged by
them, even if they are unlawful.79
In other words, some practices engaged in by lenders in consumer
financial transactions may be illegal but fail to attract public outrage because they are too difficult to understand or explain.80 This category seems
to be a particularly important and intractable one from a regulatory perspective because it is where legal constraints operate on their own, unaided
by other forms of constraint. Thus, this category deserves particular policy
attention; tools and institutions designed to regulate complex areas such as

74. On the business model of these companies, which has been characterized as “regulatory
entrepreneurship.” See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S.
CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017). Broad and unnecessary occupational licensing laws also furnish good
examples. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Cartels by Another Name: Should
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093, 1102 (2013).
75. Aggressive and flamboyant debt collection practices—such as harassing debtors at their
homes and businesses while dressed as Zorro, a monk, or a clown—are permitted in Spain but not
England, because, according to one would-be debt collector, the English “are a bunch of wimps.” See
Jon Sindreu, Spain Has a Debt Problem and So Now It Has a Zorro Problem, WALL ST. J. (July 28,
2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spain-has-a-debt-problem-and-so-now-it-has-azorro-problem-1501172207. No doubt the collector would feel similarly about Americans.
76. While I know of no evidence of this particular practice having been pursued by collectors
on these shores, it bears noting that more aggressive practices were long condoned here. See, e.g.,
FLEMING, supra note 36 (“Known as ‘bawler-outs,’ female debt collectors tracked down the delinquent
borrower at home or work and loudly criticized him for his failure to pay back the money borrowed.”).
77. The activities described would likely violate numerous provisions of U.S. law, including
numerous sections of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2018), not to mention
relevant state laws.
78. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 18, at 149 (describing complex, “abusive” fees added,
sometimes illegally, to some “high-cost” mortgages).
79. Professor Willis has described, for instance, the panoply of sophisticated ways in which
financial institutions responded to regulation mandating that banks force consumers to opt-in to (rather
than opt-out of) fee-based overdraft protection, largely complying with the letter but undermining the
policy goals of the law. Willis, supra note 27, at 1183–1200; see also BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 66
(noting complexity and number of credit card fees). Professor Bar-Gill also notes that contract terms
(such as dispute resolution limits) can be put into contracts even by sellers with “high-quality products
and reliable customer service.” BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 28.
80. Similarly, there is some evidence that consumers simply misunderstand some merchant
practices or legal protections, particularly with respect to privacy. See Willis, supra note 54, at 73
(“Most consumers falsely believe that the law significantly restricts collection of consumer information and that the existence of a ‘Privacy Policy’ means their information is not shared with third
parties.” (citations omitted)).
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consumer finance must be tailored to the social and technical context of
such transactions, or they risk ineffectiveness.
Area 7: Actions that are technically feasible but are neither socially
acceptable nor legal.
A variety of actions might fall into this category—including most
misuses of the powerful information technologies that are in the hands of
businesses engaging with consumers online. One obvious example, already mentioned above, is Wells Fargo’s opening of accounts in customers’ names without consent and imposing unwanted and unneeded charges
on auto loan customers.81 Such actions were obviously technically possible, but they ran afoul of the law as well as of social norms. Virtually any
other technological capacity could be similarly abused, and the actor in
question might face both legal and social sanctions.82
Area 8: Actions that are legal, socially acceptable, and technically
feasible.
This final category is the intersection of the three categories of feasible actions—actions that are not effectively constrained by any of the three
types of constraint. It is the category of permitted actions (PA). It is the
area within which most of the behavior actually engaged in by consumers
and merchants falls. This area includes acts that are legally prohibited but
are not subject to effective enforcement; or acts that are unsavory and socially unacceptable but so difficult to detect that market participants are
undeterred from engaging in them.
Importantly, an act that falls in this category is not necessarily benign.
Old-fashioned practices such as charging very high interest rates and imposing high penalties remain common, yet many consumer advocates
would prefer that not to be the case. Technology has enabled all sorts of
newfangled practices, such as merchants’ using Big Data to monitor consumers’ moods and target them with sales pitches when they are least
likely to be cautious or frugal.83 Such practices, when they become known,
may eventually be thought violative of social norms; but they are not now
(or they are engaged in covertly and, thus, cannot draw sufficient opprobrium). Assessing whether these various behaviors should be condemned
socially or legally is beyond the scope of this model.
The examples above illustrate each of the eight areas contained in this
model. There might be disagreements over the areas in which some of
81. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Review Finds 1.4 Million More Suspect Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/business/dealbook/wells-fargoaccounts.html?_r=0.
82. Other behaviors do not, but at some point, could, fall in this category if laws were better
enforced (legally constraining them), or if public awareness were higher (socially constraining them).
83. Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1320 1322–
23 (2015) (“With big data and the presence of computers, cell phones, and other devices intermediating
consumer transactions, firms can tailor marketing, products, and prices to a single consumer in real
time.”).
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these examples should be located. As will be discussed in more detail below, social acceptability is not an either/or proposition, and legal and technical feasibility are also subject to debate in some cases. But at a minimum,
and notwithstanding some play at the joints, the examples demonstrate that
a wide variety of different types of acts, and varying combinations of constraints, exert force on those acts. All can be mapped on this model.
It can be readily seen how, as you consider the appropriate policy
response to a particular act, the response will be guided, in part, by where
you locate that act in this model. In some cases, social or technical steps
might be sufficient to raise the “price” on a particular act. In other cases,
for instance where a socially disfavored or technically less capable group
is likely to be targeted, legal intervention will more likely be necessary.
Parts III and IV of this Article explore some of these issues. First, however, the next Section explores the justifications for, and premises of, the
model.
D. Why a Model of “Consumer Protection”?
This model provides a basic description of the consumer protection
ecosystem and is intended as a starting point—a way of better structuring
discussion over appropriate policy strategies and outcomes. It focuses on
permitted actions in consumer transactions, taking a functional and applied
approach to the constraints on the behavior of participants in such transactions. Later, Part III of this Article will explore ramifications of this model,
and Part IV will address potential objections to it and discuss ways it can
be refined and expanded upon in future work. The remainder of this Part
provides some necessary background on the premises for the model and
the reasons it is needed.
Taking a step back, then: Why are consumer commercial relationships different? Why do we need a separate model for them? Consumer
transactions present complicated policy problems for several reasons.
Outside of the consumer arena, standards of business and commercial
affairs are largely founded on expectations of repeat-dealing and reciprocity.84 The law generally relies upon the assumption of sophistication, permits liberal freedom of contract, and applies doctrines such as caveat emptor to such transactions.
By contrast, businesses that engage in consumer transactions—
which, for convenience, this Article simply refers to as “merchants”—are

84. The locus classicus on the relational underpinnings of standard business-to-business transactions is described in Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). For a survey of subsequent literature, see Macauley & Mertz,
supra note 14.
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on a different footing with respect to consumers.85 Merchants deal with
consumers who have a wide variety of tools, expectations, and capabilities. In addition, often the merchant will be the only repeat player in a
commercial transaction; consumers often deal with a particular merchant
or purchase that merchant’s product on a one-off basis, or, at most, a sporadic basis. For example, individuals buy houses or cars, or take out student loans, only a few times in their lives, at most; whereas sellers and
lenders engage in such transactions many times a day. For this reason,
merchants attain greater sophistication concerning the legal and financial
nuances of a given commercial transaction.
In addition, most consumer injuries are too small to warrant seeking
legal redress. For example, imagine consumers mistreated by a merchant
in transactions involving no more than a few hundred dollars each. Even
if the consumers were to be commercially sophisticated enough to know
they have been injured and to know that the injury is legally remediable,
the damages suffered by those consumers likely would be inadequate to
justify taking any legal action on an individual basis. Absent laws providing for special remedies or procedural devices to facilitate legal actions,
repeat-playing merchants may be underdeterred from violating the rights
of such consumers.86 This is the type of situation that has led to calls to
make special legal tools available to consumers, such as class actions, attorney’s fees provisions, statutory damages, and so on.87
The consumer commercial ecosystem presents unique risks for merchants, as well. Merchants’ reputations are frequently at stake in consumer
transactions. They can suffer severe damage as a result of just one wellpublicized dissatisfaction with their products or service.88 Moreover, as
the liability regime applied to merchants dealing with consumers reflects,
the expectations for product safety are different in the consumer arena than
in the realm of standard business relationships, where damages models are
more predictable and risk can be more successfully distributed among both
sellers and buyers. Finally, the special substantive and procedural protections for consumers mentioned above, such as class actions, fee-shifting,
and statutory damages, also raise the risks for merchants.
Finally, the consumer ecosystem also presents an unusual political
economy. Consumer-protective laws are likely to have a sharp impact on
85. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 159–62 (2007) (discussing relevant differences in “contracting culture[]” in consumer context); Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the
Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 282–83, 285–87 (2012) [hereinafter Schmitz, Access to
Consumer] (contrasting “B2C,” or business-to-consumer practices with “B2B,” or business-to-business, practices).
86. This fact is discussed at length, and supported empirically, in Schmitz, Access to Consumer,
supra note 85, at 283–84; see also Schmitz, supra note 20, at 214.
87. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 81 n.72.
88. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 46, at 569–70 (citing examples of individual customer complains reaching an audience of many millions, and discussing instances where social pressures altered
policies at major companies).
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the bottom line of particular merchants or industries, and, thus, may spur
organized and focused opposition; whereas the benefits to consumers may
be substantial but diffuse. On the other hand, some laws may seem desirable to the general public but have widespread social costs that outweigh
their benefits.
These unique features of the consumer protection ecosystem have
significant ramifications for law and for policy. This model is a way of
approaching these problems more comprehensively. Importantly, it emphasizes that all of these unusual features involve not just legal but also
social and technological factors.
Virtually all concede that it is necessary to protect consumers from
some types of dealings and find ways of providing some legal remedy even
when individual private litigation is unlikely to deter bad action.89 But
there is little agreement on the scope or nature of that regulation. Some
advocates would retain only minimal regulation of egregious, often fraudulent, activity. They argue that any gains to consumers from more regulation would be outweighed by slowed economic growth resulting from inhibited behavior. In this view, regulation intended to protect consumers
often drives them away from transactions that would improve their and
society’s welfare.90 By contrast, advocates for more consumer protection—largely, for the last couple of decades, under the influence of behavioral economics—emphasize ways in which classical rational-actor economics fails to describe actual consumer behavior.91 These voices have
dominated the legal academic literature on consumer issues. A large body
of scholarship has advanced arguments concerning the inadequacy of traditional common law protections and remedies, particularly those sounding in contract, for consumer commerce.92 This Article doesn’t resolve this

89. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (arguing that consumer protection statutes overdeter, but acknowledging the need for some enhanced protections for consumer
transactions).
90. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (2008) (discussing the benefits of deregulation of housing market).
91. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 24–25 (applying behavior insights concerning limitations of rational-actor theory to the context of consumer commercial transactions); DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS
OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 10–13 (2016) (summarizing behavioral economics principles that have
been applied to financial regulation). Consumer advocates have traditionally been skeptical of costbenefit analysis, although some proposals have been made to incorporate it more explicitly, in a way
that is tailored to the distinct context of consumer protection. See Jeff Sovern, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis Help Consumer Protection Laws? Or at Least Benefit Analysis?, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1241,
1242 (2014) (cautiously endorsing a modified cost-benefit analysis of proposed consumer-protective
regulations); id. at 1242–43 (explaining general reluctance of consumer advocates to endorse costbenefit analysis).
92. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commercial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 550–52 (1997); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code
Drafting Process: Will Articles 2, 2b And 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 124–27
(1997).
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debate but tries to establish a common framework for debate of particular
policy questions.
The very term consumer protection plays a problematic role in policy
debates. Plainly, “consumer law” is too narrow a term for the subject of
this model, which goes beyond mere legal constraint. “Consumer protection” is an improvement in some ways because it signals a concern for the
social, economic, and technological context of commercial relationships.
But it too has a weakness: it is provocative and loaded.93 “Consumer protection” might seem to locate agency solely in merchants. It might seem
paternalistic to cast all consumers as vulnerable parties in need of protection. In addition, the term focuses solely on the aspect of regulation intended to protect consumers, but regulations may have other salient or
even primary goals—for instance, distributive concerns as between different groups of consumers.
But “consumer protection” remains the dominant term used in public
policy discourse, and it is useful in certain respects because the primary
thrust of this field is to consider ways in which consumers are different
from other commercial actors—usually because they need more protection. My preference is to discuss only “the ecosystem of consumer commercial relationships,” because this captures, with a more neutral tone, the
scope of the key policy questions. But the phrase hardly rolls off the
tongue, and there are no other ready substitutes. So, for the time being, I
have recourse to the term consumer protection because it still appears to
be the best available, serviceable—if flawed—term for indicating the general subject matter of this model and of this Article.
Having explained the premises and basic justification for the model
in this Part, the next Part of this Article turns to the ramifications of the
model for policymaking, focusing on the interrelated issues of how constraints relate to one another, and how they change over time.
II. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Interdependence of Constraints
By this point in the Article, its single most important ramification
should be clear: consumer law cannot be considered without a thorough
awareness of the other constraints that effectively govern consumer commercial relationships. This model reveals the interdependence of legal and
other forms of constraint on consumer commercial interactions.

93. Professor—now Representative—Porter notes that she avoids this term because the subject
is important to others than traditionally conceived “consumer advocates.” For instance, many law students take consumer law courses because they anticipate working for corporate compliance departments. See generally KATHERINE M. PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW (2016). As noted already,
the model in this Article is intended to be applicable broadly and not simply as a device in favor of
traditional “consumer protection” notions. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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In light of this interdependence, the question is which constraints
should be preferred to accomplish a particular policy goal. Advocates and
policymakers should consider nonlegal interventions as important levers
of policy.94 It makes sense to look beyond legal means of constraining undesirable actions on consumer commerce—or expanding the possibilities
for desirable ones.95 This Article takes as a given that some constraints are
desirable to accomplish policy goals in the consumer context. But this
model applies regardless of whether one prefers a minimalist policy approach or a more interventionist one.
The benefits and drawbacks of different policy levers may depend on
the type of challenge presented. For instance, saddling merchants with disclosure requirements,96 and making them face the risk of reputational damage as a result of what is disclosed, may sometimes suffice to accomplish
a policy goal.97 Sometimes, outright prohibition of a given practice may
be justified.98 At other points, prohibition would be overkill, and policymakers may choose to rely on public advocacy or technological tools to
accomplish a particular goal.99
Importantly, this model suggests that consumer policy goals could be
promoted by the development and promotion of technological tools.100 In
addition to examples already mentioned, such as pop-up blockers and advocacy efforts on social media,101 advocates have floated numerous other
ideas, including retro “technologies” such as postal banking102 and better
consumer-oriented dispute resolution tools,103 as well as cutting edge technologies such as artificially intelligent “customer software agents.”104 Another example is encrypted browsers such as Tor, which are powerful tools
94. On “policy levers,” see, e.g., Surden, supra note 15, at 200–01.
95. As noted below, this is particularly true in times of rapid technological change, when the
pace of legal change may lag far behind behavior on the ground.
96. For instance, disclosures concerning a lender’s customer base or operations could be helpful: What is the average indebtedness (or ratio of average indebtedness to income) of a lender’s customers? What is the average default rate? How many first loans are ultimately rolled over into second
loans without the balance being reduced?
97. See, e.g., Abby Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and Lex Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 129–31 (2016) (discussing “auditing and enforcing performance standards,” and the promises and perils of reputation-based regulatory efforts). Note that this
is a different sort of disclosure from that traditionally required by consumer laws, which focuses on
disclosures to consumers, and has been widely criticized, although it is still thought to serve an important role. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and
the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 712 (2006).
98. For instance, scholars have identified certain mortgage lending practices that they believe
are “unsuitable per se.” Engel & McCoy, supra note 27, at 1344–45.
99. See id. (identifying practices that are “problematic” but not “unsuitable per se”).
100. I have elsewhere discussed the purposes and possibilities for these tools under the term
“public interest innovation.” See Bradley, supra note 3, at 89–92.
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
102. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS (2015).
103. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz & Colin Rule, The New Handshake: Where We Are Now, 2 INT’L
J. ONLINE DISPUTE RES. 84, 97–98 (2016).
104. See BAR-GILL, supra note 19, at 4–5 (suggesting making cell phone use data available to
consumers to aid in selecting optimal service plans); Fairfield, supra note 50; Rory Van Loo, Rise of
the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1323 (2017) (advocating similar tools).

2019]

THE COMSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM

65

to prevent not only government but also business surveillance of Internet
users.105
The development of pro-consumer tools may initiate an arms race,
because merchants may respond in kind. For instance, to prevent consumers’ ability to price compare, merchants have labeled essentially identical
items differently.106 But the effort to develop tools may be worthwhile despite the risk of such responses. Crowd-funded “start-ups” might effectively develop useful technologies, creating potential solutions for problems that other constraints have been ineffective at solving.107 Or tools
could be developed by public institutions such as the Federal Trade Commission108 and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whose database
of consumer complaints has proven to be a useful technological tool for
promoting consumer protection—and spurring legal action.109 Tools could
be produced by for-profit, charitable, or educational entities interested in
consumer issues.110 Even mainstream, reputationally sensitive industry
players might seek to “protect” the market from “predatory” actors, while
also protecting their own market share along the way.
Scholars have also proposed hybrid forms of technologically driven
regulation that would deploy sophisticated information-gathering tools to
yield more precise governance of consumer transactions. For instance, one
ambitious but promising proposal is to require firms engaging in complex
consumer transactions to draft disclosures that ensure actual consumer un-

105. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 175 (2013) (“In addition to a regulatory
shift . . . we envision technical innovation to help protect privacy in certain instances.”). They propose
regulatory requirements involving disclosure of data sources and algorithms.
106. PETERSON, supra note 18, at 242–43 (“Despite the revolution in information technology
over the past twenty years, comparatively vulnerable high-cost debtors have not improved their ability
to price-shop, [or] organize preferences . . .”); Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1345.
107. Professor Fairfield argues: “Companies have little incentive to build tools for consumers
that would prevent companies themselves from accessing potentially valuable data. That task needs to
be handled by hackers, coding groups, consumer advocate groups, and private companies that want to
move into building a market for pro-consumer technologies.” JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED:
PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 224 (2017); see also O'NEIL, supra note 38,
at 118 (“[M]athematical models can sift through data to locate people who are likely to face great
challenges, whether from crime, poverty, or education. It’s up to society whether to use that intelligence to reject and punish them—or to reach out to them with the resources they need. We can use the
scale and efficiency that make WMDs [‘Weapons of Math Destruction,’ i.e., the tools of Big Data] so
pernicious in order to help people. It all depends on the objective we choose.”).
108. E.g., Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1385–86 (proposing the FTC develop a program to gather
data and implement a supervision program of retailers’ practices).
109. Several rich scholarly works have explored the database. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Calling
on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177
(2017); Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 895, 895 (2015);
Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 57 (2012).
110. Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 168, 173 (2002) (mentioning some such tools); see also O’NEIL, supra note 38, at 144
(describing efforts at Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, and MIT to study crowdsourcing campaigns and
biases in hiring).
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derstanding of the proposed terms—and submit to spot-testing to demonstrate compliance.111 All such innovations are worth considering alongside
traditional law and regulation, and this Article’s model supports that sort
of regulatory experimentation.
Some efforts might seek to affect both technological constraints and
social ones. One approach for consumer advocates would be to look to
technologies that promote collective action and broad participation in policymaking, such as social media networks—to help consumers help themselves.112 Advocacy to form or change public opinion is a tried-and-true
strategy and, in this particular arena, has long taken the shape of trying to
deter behavior by “naming and shaming” market participants for acts that
are not socially acceptable.113 Social media platforms have given consumers a new tool for raising concerns with companies—and coordinating
with one another to do so.114 These tools facilitate collection of data, development of ideas, and coordination of efforts.115 They can provide means
of political organizing and permit highly motivated individuals, who might
otherwise have been too remote, to link together and form policy coalitions.116
The capacity of technology to lower the costs of consumer coordination speaks directly to a key rationale for consumer protection: the comparative weakness of individual consumers engaging in one-off transactions with repeat-playing merchants. This is an area in which consumerfavoring technology, whether produced by for-profit firms or in a public
interest context, holds considerable promise, potentially increasing the
power of technical and social constraints on merchants.117 Again, the interdependence of the different constraints in this model is clear because
improved advocacy networks could affect both legal and social constraints.

111. See Willis, supra note 83, at 1315 (“Performance-based consumer law together with ongoing field-testing has the potential to incentivize firms to educate rather than obfuscate, to develop
simple and intuitive product designs that align with, rather than defy, consumer expectations, and to
channel consumers toward products that are suitable for consumers’ circumstances.”).
112. See Arbel, supra note 19 (suggesting mechanisms for improving reputational constraints on
businesses in consumer interactions).
113. There are many well-known examples, including RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED:
THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 18–23 (1965) (describing car manufacturers’ neglect of, and disdain for, effective safety measures in cars); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE
12 (1906) (describing conditions and practices of meat-packing industry and leading to broad industry
reforms both voluntary and legally imposed).
114. Jonathan Wolfe, Want Faster Airline Customer Service? Try Tweeting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/travel/airline-customer-service-twitter.html.
115. Vindu Goel, G.M. Uses Social Media to Manage Customers and Its Reputation, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/after-huge-recall-gm-speaks-to-customers-through-social-media.html.
116. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, Social Networks Must Face Up to Their Political Impact, WIRED
(Jan. 5, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/social-networks-must-face-political-impact/.
117. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text.
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B. Constraints Over Time
The three broad types of constraint that form the basis of this model
are interconnected in a second way: a change in any one of them will affect
the others. This model reveals the importance of evaluating changes in the
various constraints as technology develops, laws are enacted or repealed,
and social attitudes change.
Often, a change in one constraint will expand or contract the set of
permitted actions, which may encourage the easing or tightening of other
constraints. One example would include a merchant who gains some
tricky, new technological advantage, which over time, after being filtered
through public deliberation and the legislative process, is then condemned
or constricted through social norms or legal regulation. Other examples
might be how social networking has changed social norms on privacy and
how electronic signatures and mobile banking have changed views on traditional transactional formalities.118 The influence can also run the other
direction: technology takes cues from society and culture; technology
businesses focus tremendous energy on trying to give consumers what
they want.119 Similarly, views on the social acceptability of particular conduct can lead to legal change120—or alternatively, views themselves can
be shaped by what has been deemed unlawful.121
The point is that the system is highly dynamic and multilayered, and
any change may set off a complex, iterative process in which various factors react to one another. This interdependence is a crucial aspect of policy
change in this arena. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this.

118. See Schmitz, supra note 20, at 247; Smith & Anderson, supra note 20.
119. Although Steve Jobs famously claimed that “customers don’t know what they want until
we’ve shown them,” this is of course not the usual method for product development in successful
technology businesses. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 143 (2011).
120. There is a vast literature on how, and for whose benefit, such change happens. See, e.g.,
Anne N. Costain & Steven Majstorovic, Congress, Social Movements and Public Opinion: Multiple
Origins of Women's Rights Legislation, 47 POL. RES. Q. 111, 111 (1994).
121. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 75 (reflecting on whether the law influenced social
norms regarding responsibilities for fence-building expenses among neighboring landowners in Shasta
County, or whether the norms shaped the legal regime); id. at 284 (noting that “legal policies themselves influence the vitality of informal systems of social control [i.e., norms]”).
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Figure 4.

Figures 1–3 took place at one moment in time (t1), and the scope of
permitted actions was the Area 8. Figure 4 advances to a later moment in
time, t2, when more actions have become feasible due to technological
advancements. Note that all of the areas in the previous figures have been
altered by the change in technology. Most importantly, the scope of permitted actions is larger, as indicated by the addition of Area 9 to Area 8.
PAt2 = 8 + 9.
Note that the scope of the law has not changed. Nonetheless, the terrain of legally permitted actions, and permitted actions generally, is significantly larger. In other words, there has been an expansion of the actions
that market participants are effectively permitted to take. Stated differently, the scope of consumer protection has been eroded by the amount of
this expansion.122
The changes represented in Figure 4 are not normatively good or bad
on their face. But they are relevant for consumer policy going forward after
time t2. A change might be used, for example, to supply a regulatory rationale—to argue that policies should be updated to deal with concerns
raised by newly feasible practices. Alternatively, the change could support
an argument that a regulation is no longer necessary because of a cheaper
or more tailored technical “fix” now available. Perhaps technological
tools, such as those now referred to under the umbrella term Big Data,
could be deployed to anticipate social or technological developments that
will render existing regulation obsolete or counterproductive. Such tools
would permit predictive regulation or deregulation, thus eliminating some
122. My use of “erosion” in this context is indebted to Professor Harry Surden. In his important
work developing similar principles (largely focused on intellectual property), Professor Surden articulates the effects of such changes: “[T]he Technological Cost of activities can change over time.
Emerging technologies frequently eliminate the capacity-limiting constraints common in the previous
technological era. When legal frameworks depend upon activities being Technologically Costly, they
are susceptible to shifts in strength, scope, or effectiveness when the Technological Cost of activities
decreases.” See Surden, supra note 15, at 138–39; id. at 142 (referring to this process as a technological
erosion of legal rights).
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of the “lag” that bedevils regulation in quickly developing policy areas.
This is the hope of some who have begun to advocate for “smarter,” more
technologically adept regulatory strategies.123
Importantly, this model underscores that many nominally “legal”
practices aren’t feasible at any given time. And, if they aren’t feasible, they
almost certainly aren’t considered by prior policymakers. Accordingly,
there is a sound rationale for new attention (whether regulatory or deregulatory in normative direction) to be focused on the newly emerging technical possibilities. This is a crucial insight yielded by the model—although, as already stated, this model does not directly address the policy
steps that should be taken.
In Figure 5, we can consider the effect of a change in the law, at a
third time: t3. Here, Area 10 is the new scope of permitted actions: PAt3
= 10. Area 11 indicates what used to be permitted at t2 but is now unlawful—it has been removed from the scope of previously permitted actions.

Figure 5.

The law has changed from time t2 to t3; there has been a constriction
of the scope of permitted actions. Because of technological advancement,
previously infeasible conduct may become easier and, thus, more common. In response—assuming that the goal is to preserve the pre-existing
baseline or the regulatory balance124—legal tools may be deployed, as depicted in Figure 5. One of the other areas could also be contracted: social
123. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
124. As with other areas of regulatory law or policy (for instance, environmental law or privacy
law), there is presumably a socially desirable amount of regulation at any given time, although what
amount that is, and what factors should be weighed to determine it, are contestable. A situation that
yields either more or less regulation than that optimum amount is socially undesirable. There is of
course no reason to believe that at a particular time we enjoy the optimum amount of regulation in any
area, although it might seem reasonable to take the current level as a baseline against which to examine
future effects—leaving to the side whether those effects either bring the existing regime closer to
alignment with an optimum regulatory arrangement or further take it out of alignment, which will be
determined by normative views concerning the baseline state of affairs and not dictated by this model.
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norms could constrain the newly possible conduct, or technological tools
could be developed by public authorities or by advocates to narrow the
scope of permitted actions.
Thus, while there may be many differences in the way legal and technical constraints are thought about or acted upon, they work in tandem and
may be substitutable for one another in the context of the effective scope
of consumer protection at any given time.125 And consumer commercial
relationships will be particularly dynamic when any of the categories of
constraints are rapidly changing. Therefore, policy analyses will have to
be equally dynamic.
The two ramifications that have been surveyed in this Part of the Article suggest that the scope of consumer policy and the stability of the regulatory framework depend on the social and technological context, which
may be highly dynamic, requiring frequent adjustments at times of social
and technological change. The area of permitted action at the center of the
Venn diagram will quickly change as new types of socially and technically
feasible activities emerge. Reacting to such changes poses particular challenges and should encourage policymakers to consider, for instance, what
types of institutions and policy approaches are best, not just in the current
context but in anticipation of future changes. This is the subject of the next
Section, which focuses on the ramifications of rapid technological change
as conceived in this Article’s consumer protection model.
C. Implications of Technological Change for Consumer Policy
Technological change deserves particular consideration. As this
model reveals in Figure 4 above, protective regulation takes place against
the factual background existing at a given time. Progress in technology
makes existing regulation outdated or ill-fitting in various ways with respect to each new reality that technology presents to market participants.
Consumer commerce has been, and continues to be, shaped by dramatic
new technology developments as a result of the rise of mobile computing
and Big Data.126 Technological changes tend to initiate an iterative and
unstable process that requires multiple interventions simply to maintain a
semblance of the pre-existing baseline of regulation—to preserve what
could be conceived of as the “regulatory balance” between the different
interests implicated in consumer transactions.
To be clear, the model also emphasizes that interventions need not be
legal in nature—we need not trust in law alone. Policy interventions could
125. On the relevant work of Professors Lessig, Ellickson, and Surden, whose ideas have greatly
influenced this project. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126. As some technologists have put it, only somewhat hyperbolically: “We are in the midst of
a great infrastructure project that in some ways rivals those of the past, from Roman aquaducts to the
Enlightenment’s Encyclopedie. We fail to appreciate this because today's project is so new, because
we are in the middle of it, and because . . . the product of our labors is intangible. The project is datafication. Like those other infrastructural advances, it will bring about fundamental changes to society.”
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 105, at 96.
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include countervailing technological developments or changes in social
norms. These practical constraints can have the effect of shifting the protective frontier in one direction or another, or of moving in the direction
of restoring the balance of interests. None of this points to any particular
answer to the important normative question of whether this “balance” is
appropriate in the first place—in other words, whether there is too much
or too little consumer protection in the baseline state. But this model provides a sound structure for approaching that question from a better-contextualized starting point.
Technological changes can unsettle an existing legal regime when
they enable a party to take actions that were previously unavailable or that
have become much easier. Such technological changes may shift a regulatory balance in one direction or the other, potentially undermining whatever policy rationale justified that regulatory status quo in the first place.
To take a prominent example from constitutional law, consider the development of infrared search technology that permits police to “search” a
house from outside on the street. When the Supreme Court grappled with
this issue in Kyllo v. United States,127 it had to determine whether its old
legal rule, which was that searches undertaken in a public place (the street)
were presumptively permitted, still applied when the search tool (infrared
camera) was much more invasive than previous technology. The tool had
the effect of shifting the balance in the favor of the searchers over the
searched. The legal rule had to shift to restrike the balance. In Kyllo, because the legal test involves reasonable expectations of privacy, social
norms were involved as well.128
In consumer law, technological developments around privacy and
personal data furnish a similar example. Consumer data can be put to uses
inconceivable when it was gathered, and users of the data explore new uses
every day. Models of protection of privacy that rely on consent cannot
make sense of such a world. Depending on how strictly consent is interpreted, productive and benign uses may be ruled out, or consumers may
suffer the consequences of aggressive, unanticipated uses of their personal
information.129
Interventions may be required more often under some conditions than
others—namely, (1) if technology is evolving quickly and (2) if it is doing
so in such a way as to significantly shift a regulatory balance. Both stated
conditions are necessary: if technological change is slow, then new interventions may correspondingly be required only rarely; if technological
change isn’t likely to shift a regulatory balance, but, instead, is merely
lowering transaction costs for all, then there is no need for intervention. It
127. 533 U.S. 27, 28–29 (2001).
128. Id. at 33–34.
129. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 105, at 173 (noting inadequacy of consent-based models “[i]n the era of big data . . . when much of data's value is in secondary uses that
may have been unimagined when the data was collected”).
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may be the case that when technological change proceeds slowly, it is easier for society to identify its effects and craft policy to deal with them. In
contrast, more rapid changes may outstrip society’s capacity for deliberation.130 In addition, regulatory capture may mean that it is difficult or impossible to regulate due to the dispersed benefit of additional regulation
and the concentrated benefit (by the industry) of failure to regulate.131
There is substantial academic literature occupied with the fact that
technological change often outpaces that of legal change.132 One lesson
from that body of research, which is consistent with this Article’s model,
is that the appropriate type of legal intervention should be influenced by
the anticipated pace of change as well as the expertise required to identify
and consider legal response to those changes. For instance, expert institutions empowered to enforce flexible, standards-based laws and regulations
may be preferable when rapid adjustments are expected.133 On the other
hand, where the market environment is relatively stable, the greater certainty and enforceability of bright-line rules may be preferable.
In the consumer protection context, the iterative process of technological change and intervention has important implications for how consumer protection laws should be crafted as well as for how institutions
should be established or empowered to monitor and enforce legal compliance in the face of technological change. There are other relevant factors
to be weighed, such as the degree of political accountability and the level
of government most appropriate for a given legal response.
The rigidity of some forms of legal response may be undesirable because technology can have complex policy effects (for instance, having
alternately consumer- or merchant-favoring aspects), and because new
technologies typically build in unanticipated ways on prior innovations.

130. The process by which social norms are developed requires at a minimum sufficient time to
pass, and public attention to be directed to the issue, such that society can become aware of the issue
and then come to views about its acceptability. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 38, at 144–60 (discussing and collecting sources on the process by which social views make their way into law).
131. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 257 (“Government rulemaking is particularly
unlikely to be welfare enhancing . . . in the many spheres of activity in which well-placed rent seekers
can obtain legislation that aids them at the greater expense of the politically weak.”); MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–3 (1965) (describing, inter alia, the greater responsiveness of legislative actors to focused interests over the broader
public that faces only diffuse harms or benefits from any particular legislative intervention).
132. This fact is especially evident in the burgeoning body of scholarship trying to bring technological innovation into the regulatory space. See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner et al., FinTech, RegTech and
the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 371 (2017); Chris
Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1035–39
(2015); Wulf A. Kaal and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts
to Data, 57 Jurimetrics (forthcoming); Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the
Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 404–08 (2019); Willis, supra note 83, at 1322–23 (proposing the use of novel testing requirements to ensure effective disclosure of important but often overlooked or misunderstood transactional terms); Willis, supra note 54, at 126–27 (noting that tech firms
can rapidly try out different tacks to see what is effective but that “[p]olicymakers are not nearly so
agile”).
133. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 132, at 397–98.
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Rigid or blanket prohibitions may have the effect of obstructing or foreclosing innovations that might prove beneficial—and might even render
regulation unnecessary. One way of preserving oversight alongside flexibility is to create “regulatory sandboxes,” zones of permitted experimentation and regulatory forbearance for technology businesses in select arenas.134
In addition to law being a slow-moving tool, and to it being vulnerable to capture, there is also the problem that it is unlikely to be as forwardlooking as technologists themselves are. It is difficult to regulate things
that we can barely dream up. Lawmakers are understandably reluctant to
be too forward-looking in regulations—to regulate hypotheticals. Regulating such “bleeding-edge” technologies rarely will seem a worthwhile use
of legislative resources or political capital. And, even if political will is
present, it requires an accurate anticipation of what emerging technology
will look like and how society and businesses will respond to its introduction.
As recently as a decade and a half ago, “going viral on social media”
was a phrase that would mean little. Thus, we could hardly have expected
regulation regarding privacy or property rights in “viral videos,” any more
than we could have expected regulation of the flying skateboards that Back
to the Future Part II predicted would be commonplace by 2015 (but that
we, unfortunately, still await).135 To take another example, a futuristic
technology that beat flying skateboards to store shelves is that of a “starter
interrupter” or “kill switch” device, which has dramatically changed the
car repossession industry (and, thus, the car lending arena, particularly for
“sub-prime” borrowers).136 Generally speaking, these are devices placed
on vehicles by lenders who, if the owner of the vehicle defaults on loan
payments, can activate the device to get its precise location, and disable
the car’s engine. The technologies required to produce such a device at
reasonable cost were only developed recently. Therefore, it is understandable that no particular laws were in place governing their use. Although
the general backdrop of common law and statutory consumer law protections were in place providing some backstop against abuses, these protections may be insufficient.137 Regulators in some states have scrambled to
investigate this technology and promulgate rules governing the way such
devices can be used—for instance, to ensure that cars are in safe places,
134. See Bradley, supra note 50, at 85–89 (discussing regulatory sandboxes).
135. BACK TO THE FUTURE II (Universal Pictures 1989). The wheeled “hoverboards” that have
become popular of late are fun to ride, but still do not approach the allure of a true flying skateboard.
136. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 78; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-payment-good-luck-moving-that-car/.
137. Juliet M. Moringiello, Electronic Issues in Secured Financing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 285, 297–303 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (surveying and critiquing current commercial law implications of this type of device); Erica N. Sweeting, Comment,
Disabling Disabling Devices: Adopting Parameters for Addressing a Predatory Auto-Lending Technique on Subprime Borrowers, 59 HOW. L.J. 817, 818–19 (2016) (arguing for stricter regulations of
such devices).
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that debtors are given advance warning, and so on.138 But such efforts, by
necessity, lag the innovations themselves. Figuring out the degree to which
legal or social constraints should fill the space left by these technological
advances is the core of the challenge (as visually depicted in Figure 4
above).
Online lending is another recently ascendant consumer transacting
technology that presents significant policy concerns. Online lenders, like
many other participants in the consumer finance industry, have benefitted
from technological innovations, including from what is perhaps euphemistically referred to as the “lowering of compliance costs.”139 But the lowering of compliance costs is not an unqualified good. It has at least two pertinent dimensions, both of which are in evidence in online lending. One
function that technology can have is to lower the cost of compliance with
existing laws and regulations. Required reports and notices can be automatically generated; charges can be accurately counted and provided at a
moment’s notice; entire swathes of “back office” functions can be automated. This lowering of transaction costs has likely yielded significant net
benefits for society.140 By contrast, compliance costs can be saved by the
evasion of legitimately imposed and normatively desirable protections.
This can occur, for instance, by exploiting technology to perform an otherwise prohibited act—essentially as a form of technologically enabled
regulatory arbitrage.141 Some online lenders, particularly those unaffiliated
with major financial institutions, seem to be profiting, at least in part, from
these unsavory practices. This is an apt example of an area where regulation understandably lagged as the industry, and the technology upon which
it relies, developed rapidly. Regulatory energy can and should be focused
on distinguishing between technologically driven reduction of compliance
costs and technologically enabling evasion of compliance itself.
As I have argued in prior work on financial technology,142 many technologies have a double edge because they provide inarguable societal benefits yet also raise consumer protection concerns. In fact, many consumer
advocates seem to believe that consumers have lost significant ground and

138. See Moringiello, supra note 137, at 297–303; Sweeting, supra note 137, at 833–34.
139. See Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV. 781,
803–04 (2018).
140. Of course, it may have problematic distributive effects, for instance on former back-office
workers whose skills are no longer in demand. But while these distributive effects may merit a policy
response, the overall benefits appear likely to have been substantial and a rational response would be
unlikely to involve clawing back use of these innovations.
141. There is an important and still developing scholarship on this point as regards the “gig economy.” See Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How
Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 327 (2016)
(“Notably, when these services take regulatory shortcuts, it is difficult to know whether the services
gain traction through genuine excellence and efficiency, or through regulatory arbitrage.”); Pollman
& Barry, supra note 74, at 384–409; id. at 397 n.61 (distinguishing between regulatory arbitrage and
the authors’ term, “regulatory entrepreneurship”). There is also important scholarship on this issue in
the context of online lenders. See Odinet, supra note 139.
142. Bradley, supra note 3, at 80–82.
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are being taken advantage of now more than ever. Unfortunately, I’m not
aware of any empirical work addressing this point.143
Take, for example, price comparison tools and shopping platforms.
These platforms allow consumers to compare potential loan terms before
they enter a car dealership or to compare insurance quotes from numerous
vendors.144 But the owner of the platform may also use the consumer’s
information to gather detailed and monetizable consumer information profiles, to steer business in preferred directions (potentially for a finder’s
fee), and to price discriminate based on anticipated consumer behavior—
all without the consumer’s awareness.145 This isn’t necessarily undesirable; overall social welfare could be increased if lenders are able to target
likely customers for particular financial products, or it could be diminished
if the outcome is merely to steer unsophisticated borrowers into inferior
products. That is a difficult, multidimensional question requiring contextualized analysis of the practices in question. Either way, the novel business practices of such platforms implicate longstanding consumer protection policy concerns and complicate the weighing of costs and benefits.
Most of the policy tools sketched in this Article may seem to be consumer-protective in the sense that they are ways of narrowing the scope of
permitted actions under the model. This is because we can expect innovations usually to expand possibilities by permitting parties to engage in behavior not previously possible—or behavior that would have been unlawful if done in the old way but may not be if done in the new way. The area
of technical feasibility, in other words, seems likely to expand rather than
contract, and, thus, to demand consistently renewed regulatory attention.
Often, the net effect of technological change will be commerce- or merchant-favoring. Merchants are well-funded repeat players with concentrated financial stakes in attaining outcomes favorable to their interests.
Merchants are likely to have greater motivation, funds, and expertise,
143. Professor Van Loo argues: “[I]n the modern technological and scale-driven commercial
landscape, the sophistication gap between buyers and sellers of goods is large and has grown considerably, as it has in financial products.” Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1334; see also Schmitz & Rule,
supra note 103, at 84 (“At the dawn of the internet age many futurists predicted that technology would
shift the balance of power between consumers and merchants in favour of consumers. . . . In some
respects the internet has achieved the opposite, ushering in a new age of consumer confusion and
disempowerment.”). Professor Zywicki provides a useful opposing view, pointing out the usefulness
of various innovations, including credit products such as overdraft protections, online lending, and
prepaid cards. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2012) [hereinafter Zywicki, Regulation of Bank]; Todd J.
Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1477,
1478–79 (2013) [hereinafter Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation].
144. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 63–68 (explaining LendingTree’s basic business model and
appeal to consumers); Van Loo, supra note 104, at 1291–93 (discussing concerns about Lending Tree
and similar companies’ choice architecture).
145. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 107, at 7 (“[C]omparison shoppers pay more for airfare
because their browser histories indicate they are very interested in certain flights.”); Bradley, supra
note 3, at 68-70 (noting “the implications of the widespread use of LendingTree’s technology are
mixed from a consumer perspective,” and discussing aspects of the model that consumers may not be
aware of and that might harm their interests); Van Loo, supra note 104, at 1267 (expressing concern
that digital intermediaries “subtly advance their interests at the expense of those they serve”).
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which allow them to induce and take advantage of innovations more effectively than consumers. As in the political context, so too in the technical
one: consumers’ diffuse interests makes them more susceptible to coordination difficulties that leave them weaker than that of concentrated merchant interests.146 Accordingly, and despite these headwinds, most policy
energy will likely have to be expended in the direction of providing greater
protection.
Early optimism about the information technology revolution has been
dampened considerably by the rise of large, extremely powerful, and
profit-focused technology companies. The rise of Big Data, which includes the technologically enabled rise of tools to track consumer Internet
behavior and the increasingly developed trade in detailed consumer
data,147 at least makes clear that information technology is no social or
political panacea. Difficult social, legal, and technological questions are
going to continue to arise—if anything, more often now than ever.
In conclusion, there are two closely related policy implications of
technological change that the consumer protection model brings to light.
First, interventions (of whatever sort) may be required more often
when technology evolves particularly quickly, as has been the case in recent years.148 As this model’s multifaceted and contextualized approach
shows, an assessment of the effects of technological change and new business practices is more complex than it might initially appear. And, mapping the effects on this model is only the beginning of the debate about
whether the developments are normatively desirable and how the developments should be dealt with as a matter of policy to provide necessary
regulation without stifling innovation. The iterative and dynamic process
reflected in this model should be a significant factor in selecting appropriate laws for consumer protection and shaping institutions for monitoring
and enforcing compliance.149 Some approaches may be more successful
than others in such a quickly changing and complex environment.
Second, because the pace of legal change may lag behind that of technological change, advocates for and against consumer protection should
consider promoting their ends through means other than law. For example,
they could encourage the development and promotion of technological
tools that accomplish advocates’ desired policy ends.
146. As noted, some technical tools may partially mitigate consumers’ disadvantage in this respect. See supra notes 113–117 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., FAIRFIELD, supra note 107, at 6.
148. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 82–92 (discussing ways to approach the regulation of
quickly evolving financial technology businesses).
149. Professor Van Loo has identified and explained the importance of the rise of “regulatory
monitors,” who often perform regulatory functions by using tools other than those of traditional enforcement. See generally Van Loo, supra note 132, at 371–72. Some of the activities of such monitors
might be classified as “legal constraints,” while others (e.g., “public shaming”) should be seen as
social constraints. Still others (e.g., requiring the provision of technical data and operational information) might function effectively as technical constraints.
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The next Part turns to potential objections to this model as presented
so far, and proposes some refinements that will help as this model is applied to particular sets of circumstances.
III. REFINEMENTS
This Part answers several potential objections and suggests directions
in which the model could be developed further.
A. Varieties of Consumers, Merchants, and Commercial Relationships
One potential critique of this model is that legal, social, and technical
factors will constrain some market participants more or less than others.
Consumers, merchants, and the transactional relationships they pursue are
all different in meaningful ways, which may not be reflected in this Article’s model.
Compare an online lender, thinly capitalized, based overseas, and established the month before a transaction, which may have little risk of legal sanction or concern for reputational cost, with an established institution with a “brick-and-mortar” presence in its customers’ community.150
The latter’s submission to social norms, to legal jurisdiction, and to regulatory compliance norms is much more likely. By contrast, ephemeral corporate entities—described above as “disposable” entities—might require
different and tighter constraints.151 Modeling the constraints on merchants
in general might not capture important variations among the range of actors.
The same principle applies to consumers. Modeling the degree to
which consumers in general are “protected” may not capture important
data concerning variations among the consumer population. Consider a
consumer from a vulnerable class, who may be more in need of protection
than the bulk of individuals who are able to navigate certain types of transaction with little to no protection.152 The need for consideration of all of
these distinctions, which applies to any analysis of commercial relationships, is especially salient in the consumer context, because many of the
justifications for consumer law emerge directly from beliefs about the vulnerabilities of particular groups or the advantages (the “uneven playing
field”) enjoyed by their commercial counterparts. A policy intervention
may hurt some consumers despite helping others.153 Other interventions
may be challenging to implement for a similar reason: efforts at consumer

150. See supra notes 32–44 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 18, at 214–30 (discussing vulnerable groups).
153. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 803, 810 (2008) (discussing the implications of “extensive consumer heterogeneity”
for consumer protection regulations, which the article generally offers arguments against).
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education or disclosure may be effective as to some but not all consumers,
having the undesirable effect of picking winners and losers.154
Not all transactions are the same, either. Transactions involving
health care have moral, legal, and financial significance beyond that of a
trip to the grocery store. A home mortgage transaction requires the coordination of numerous actors, compliance with complex regulations, and
the undertaking of a large financial obligation by the consumer. What successfully constrains misbehavior in one type of transaction may not do so
in another (due, for instance, to different degrees of concern over social
pressure), or may constrain misbehavior at one price level but not another
(due, for instance, to degrees of concern over legal compliance risk).
No doubt, this model may yield a different set of permitted actions in
one context than in another. It is dependent on the time, place, actors, and
transactions under consideration. Responding to this concern, one way this
model could be applied in particular situations is by mapping how parties
in a particular type of commercial relationship might experience the relevant constraints. In other words, the characteristics of the participants
(merchants as well as consumers), and the types of transaction(s) they intend to pursue, could be considered in applying this model to a policy
question. Each relationship—each unique set of participants and each
unique type and size of transaction—could be considered by reference to
a different version of the model’s diagram. This approach simply reflects
the reality that each consumer relationship is governed by a different configuration of constraints. More tailored versions of this model could reflect
this more nuanced aspect of reality.
This Article avoids the weighing of justifications for consumer protection.155 Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider how different laws
and institutions may be more justifiable or salient to different regulatory
constituencies. For example, some consumer protections are geared toward addressing distributive concerns, including laws that require bank
customers to opt-in to “overdraft protection,” and prescribing methods for
banks applying and processing overdraft transactions and charges.156
Leaving aside the merits of these particular laws, they have little bearing
on the lives of most wealthy consumers; rather, they are methods for financial institutions to wring profit from small accounts. By contrast, the
seemingly unobjectionable right to have a free “credit freeze” put on credit

154. Professor Willis notes that technologies might allow merchants and regulators to distinguish
among groups. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 54, at 126–27 (“Consumers are a diverse and fickle lot;
what one consumer finds acceptable another finds out-of-bounds, and a single consumer might find a
path-breaking firm’s actions disquieting at first but unremarkable if the rest of the market moves in
the same direction. However, firms can send a diverse set of marketing messages (informed by behavioral tracking data) and only need one of these to work with any particular consumer.”) (footnote
omitted)).
155. See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 93, at 10–12.
156. See, e.g., Zywicki, Regulation of Bank, supra note 143, at 1141 (2012) (summarizing, and
criticizing, current regulatory approaches).
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reports at the major credit reporting agencies seems likely to benefit primarily the relatively sophisticated, who will understand why a freeze is a
good idea, who will bother to do it, who have significant credit to protect,
and who do not need to access new credit regularly because they maintain
ample open lines. Further work may require that this Article’s model better
address the differences between protections such as these that are focused
on particular groups and protections whose benefits are not so concentrated. More refined and specific models might better describe the dynamics that will be at play in specific consumer protection subareas.
A specific concern of this nature, which may become more salient as
technology becomes more pervasive in daily consumer transactions, is access to technology. If it is the case that technological advancements can
serve as consumer protection tools, then access to the relevant technology
amounts to access to justice. For instance, tech-savvy people may be more
protected from abuses by technological tools. If it were easy to confirm
that a large percentage of a given group is already protected through those
means, policymakers might not deem it worthwhile to help that group any
further through law. The problem is an obvious one with respect to specifically legal tools, such as online dispute resolution tools, which may in
effect require access not just to a reliable Internet connection but also tools
for document creation, scanning, or submission, requiring a significant degree of technological access and skill.
The same concern may be present less directly, but just as importantly, with respect to tools for protecting privacy, or for coordinating
consumer advocacy on social media. The capacity to deploy social media
effectively is a modern skill. Knowledge of, and access to, the best technological tools for accomplishing a given consumer’s goals may be beyond the capacity of some. But because access to legal tools—lawyers,
legal research tools, etc.—has long been available in only a limited fashion
to many, it is far from clear that reliance on technological tools would
make low-resourced individuals worse off on net. At the same time it remains important that, merely because the areas of deprivation and inequality have shifted, reliance upon technology not lead to an erroneous conclusion that access to justice issues are solved.
In addition, consumer privacy, discrimination against protected classes, and abusive contracting practices have all formed important parts of
policy discussions in the consumer arena, yet they all have different etiologies and demand distinct responses.157 Some areas may be more susceptible to legal interventions than to technologically driven ones. Other areas
157. The realm of privacy is an area of consumer-facing policy where there is a very well-developed literature disaggregating a number of different concerns. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy
Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1060, 1065 (2009); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 124–32 (2014); Surden, supra
note 23, at 1606–07.
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of consumer protection may be more prone to undetected “creep” of technological advancement at the expense of legal protection.158 More refined
versions of this model could be useful in identifying these distinctive characteristics.
In sum, this model can provide both a bird’s eye view as well as more
tailored, fine-grained views. This capacity is a feature, not a bug. This
model can aggregate various forms of legal protection and technological
capability and may obscure important distinctions among different types
of consumer protection concerns. Setting an appropriate level of detail for
a given application of the model requires careful judgment and may provoke debate.
A final observation here is that it is not just this model, but the underlying law and policy, that needs to become more refined to take into
account differences among different actors and relationships. What this
critique reveals is that a move toward bespoke consumer policy (and not
just a bespoke model) needs to be considered more seriously.159 Perhaps
laws and policies should be tailored to types of consumers, types of merchants, and to the types of commercial relationships entered into.160 This
might represent a radical shift in some ways but might also make the most
sense of a field that currently otherwise lacks coherence. This model can
hopefully serve as a tool to advocate for that change.
B. Consumer Self-Defense and Learning
A second objection is of a more libertarian bent: this model relies too
heavily on the paternalistic underpinnings of traditional consumer protection and ignores the degree to which consumers can and will protect themselves if it is in their interest to do so, by learning to be suspicious of dangerous actors or practices and otherwise adjusting their behavior.161 In
158. “Technology creep” is a term that has been used in various contexts to indicate the way that
new technologies can accumulate over time to bring changes that seem small individually but in the
aggregate are quite substantial. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, How to Leave Work at the Office, CNN
(Mar. 30, 2009), https://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/03/30/leave.work.at.the.office/index.html (using term with respect to manage workplace technologies and demands with personal life); Adrienne
Erin, Technology Creep is Making Healthcare More Expensive, BHM HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS,
https://bhmpc.com/2014/12/technology-creep-making-healthcare-expensive/ (using term with respect
to healthcare technologies and expenses).
159. This is part of what Professor Langevoort refers to as the “dilemma of investor protection.”
LANGEVOORT, supra note 91, at 13 (2016) (“Investor protection struggles with the many different
kinds of investors in the marketplace.”). As he notes, investment “sophistication” isn’t an either/or
test, and knowledge and education don’t map cleanly onto outcomes: “Research evidence suggests
that victims of investment scams are characterized by somewhat higher investment knowledge than
nonvictims, a result attributable to the perils of ego and overconfidence. A little knowledge can be a
dangerous thing.” Id. at 126.
160. Such a proposal raises its own set of concerns, however. See, e.g., Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 309, 310 (2019); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 333 (2019); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 255 (2019).
161. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 153, at 811 (“[T]he neoclassical case for markets rests on the
more qualified assumption that learning actually matters.”); Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation,
supra note 143, at 1463–64.
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other words, this model does not include consumers’ own agency. After
all, as the objection goes, consumers are “protected” from any activities
that they won’t “fall for,” that they “protect themselves” from, whether by
declining to enter into a particular transaction, or resisting certain forms or
terms of a transaction. For example, they can decline the often-offered
“extended warranties” and the many other upsell products that are not economically beneficial for consumers. It might be the case that technological
advantages only hold sway, if at all, for a particular time and then fade in
their power over savvy consumers.
This sort of adjustment is plausible, in many respects, as to consumers who are capable of making such adjustments—those in possession of
a sufficient degree of technological or financial literacy. That said, there
is reason for skepticism concerning the idea that “consumer education”
obviates the need for external constraints on merchant behavior.162 In any
case, assuming this learning sometimes occurs on a wide scale, the objection is that a model that ignores it could induce misguided policy efforts,
which would further hinder efficient and beneficial commercial activities
through onerous regulation. This line of thought is worth exploration, especially by empiricists who may be able to study the degrees to which
theories of consumer behavior underlying this critique are borne out in
reality.
This factor is omitted from this Article’s model because this model is
structured to deal with external constraints on behavior rather than selfconstraints consumers might provide for themselves, and there is no obvious way to integrate these “consumer adaptation” factors. If, indeed, consumers are capable of protecting themselves against a given merchant
strategy, whether from the outset or through adjustment over time, then
the justification for external protections of whatever sort will diminish.
This model, in other words, is implicated when consumers as a whole or
(more often) as a group with certain specified characteristics, are in need
of the protection that can be provided by external sources such as regulations, institutions, technologies, or simply social opprobrium. Whether the
need exists cannot be answered by reference to this model.
A more pointed version of the objection might be that this model is
not as neutral as it purports to be regarding the underlying justifications
for regulation. Perhaps the model “loads the dice” in a pro-intervention
way by focusing on certain external constraints to the exclusion of other
internal ones.
But this model leaves a wide opening for nonlegal, self-help mechanisms such as technological tools or public advocacy to be used as policy
tools (as discussed in the preceding part). To extend the idea of self-help
to the notion of a consumer simply thinking twice before engaging in a
162. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197,
197 (2008); Van Loo, supra note 45, at 1349–50.
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transaction would move this Article from the realm of law and policy, and
more directly to the realm of psychology. While other scholars are producing excellent work on the psychology of consumer commercial behavior,
this Article is not intended as a contribution to that work. Insofar as these
“interior” constraints are salient, they exist apart from and prior to anything in the model. This model focuses on factors that are more readily
observable in policy analysis. It is not intended to denigrate or minimize
the importance of underlying preferences, beliefs, and behaviors that are
important aspects of consumer commercial relationships.
C. Systemic Risk, Discrimination, Innovation, and Other Policy Concerns
A final limitation is that by focusing on consumer protection, the
model does not directly speak to other goals of consumer law and policy.
These goals include working against prohibited forms of discrimination,
fostering technological innovation, protecting trade secrets, and avoiding
systemic risks to the broader economy that could be caused by consumer
commercial relationships gone wrong. This model provides a framework
for understanding what functionally constrains participants in transactions.
It does not canvas all considerations relevant to normative judgments
about particular policies or particular commercial transactions. Whether
or not those policies are normatively desirable when the complete scope
of their societal costs and benefits are considered is a question to which
this model contributes but does not furnish the sole basis for answering. In
other words, this model focuses on the constraints that regulate the commercial relationships formed between consumer and merchant. Because of
this, it omits consideration of some of the externalities, whether positive
or negative, of those relationships.
Subprime mortgage loans to consumers played a prominent role in
the 2007–2009 financial crisis.163 The extent to which the primary cause
of the financial crisis was consumer borrowing, rather than the esoteric
financial uses to which it was put by structured finance experts at financial
institutions, remains a matter of debate. Regardless, current regulations
with respect to similar transactions are intended to protect the participants
–—and to cushion the broader economy from the shock of these loans all
going bad at once. This model does not directly reflect the additional goals
or effects of policies.
Similarly, this model also ignores the many technological changes
that benefit society at large. For instance, technological advances often
lower transaction costs in commercial relationships, benefitting all. Some
innovations in FinTech companies have done this by facilitating payments
in consumer transactions, permitting easier detection of fraud, and so

163. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 71, at 820–21 (summarizing scholarly sources and debates
on consumer issues and the financial crisis).

2019]

THE COMSUMER PROTECTION ECOSYSTEM

83

on.164 As mentioned above, some technological innovations lower costs by
permitting companies to avoid regulatory compliance, exploiting regulatory loopholes, or evading regulators’ detection of wrongdoing.165 These
present and anticipated technological developments are relevant factors in
determining whether to regulate and how to do so. Prohibitive commandand-control regulations may inhibit development of societally beneficial
(and even consumer-protective) technologies. Fostering technological innovation is a social good, and innovation-dampening effects of regulation
are externalities worth considering, but this model does not directly include such considerations.
Another example is antidiscrimination laws. These laws are intended
to protect particular would-be participants in transactions, and the model
therefore includes them in part. But they are also intended to contribute to
broader societal goals, the inculcation and promulgation of important
norms and values that go beyond a particular situation to some of our most
cherished, fundamental values. The effect a given policy would have on
discrimination norms more broadly (i.e., as affecting others outside of a
particular consumer-merchant relationship) is not reflected in the
model.166
Numerous other values and goals could be added to this list. Environmental and public health concerns are implicated in some consumer
transactions. Consumer law disclosure regimes, which are intended to
make sure corporate responsibility can be assigned for violations of law,
can be used by competitors to threaten businesses’ interests in maintaining
trade secrets and other competitive aspects of their firm’s activities.
These externalities are certainly relevant to the normative consideration of particular policies. Inclusion of these factors might lead to a variety
of conclusions about regulation: one set of risks lies primarily in underregulation of systemically risky or discriminatory activities. Another set
of risks lies in overregulation of (technologically enabled) commerce, and
the innovation-dampening, anticompetitive effects of compulsory disclosure of trade secrets.
This Article is intended to support, and not preempt, efforts to include
a broader range of factors in commercial policy analysis. While this Article’s model focuses on consumer-merchant relations, a similar modeling
effort might illuminate analogous interrelationships among different types
of constraints in other relevant areas. Certainly, the challenges presented
164. See generally Bradley, supra note 3, at 63–80.
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166. It is also, of course, possible that certain policies might be most effective in accomplishing
broader societal goals (for instance, those requiring public commitments and building “compliance
culture” within firms). Others, by contrast, might have little effect on society at large but affect particular consumer relationships in a concrete way (for instance, policies that simply try to take certain
forms of discrimination off the table, such as Airbnb’s practical move to mask characteristics that
hosts were using to profile potential guests, see Bradley, supra note 3, at 90 n.102). These distinctions,
too, provide reasonable bases for policy discussions.
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by technological and social change raise significant policy concerns beyond those traditionally considered in the consumer protection literature.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s consumer protection model provides a simplified, stylized depiction of complex realities. But it provides a flexible and comprehensive way of fitting together the many nuanced strands of empirical,
theoretical, and doctrinal scholarship that have made consumer law a vibrant and growing area of attention (and controversy) in the United States
and globally. This model depicts how different types of constraints on consumer commercial relationships work together, affect one another, and
must be tracked carefully over time in order for accurate policy judgments
to be formed.
The most important extension of this work will be in showing how
not only the model, but consumer policy itself, could better incorporate
distinctions among different types of consumers and merchants, different
types of transactions and relationships, and among the various justifications thought to support different types of consumer protective laws and
institutions. This model will hopefully aid in that future research and policymaking.

